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CONTENTS	PAGE
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY	
'QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' on Applying VCP's Military Strategy (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 19 Oct 79) .....	1
Editorial Details Commander System Within Army (Editorial; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 79).....	6
New Air Defense Requirements Outlined (Hoang Van Khanh; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 79)	18
Guidelines Presented for Improving Rear Service Management (Nguyen Xuan Luong; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 79) .....	28
Article Stresses Improvement of Local Military Commands (Nguyen Thai; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 79) ..	38
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID	
Party Delegation Attends Peruvian CP Congress (VNA, 16 Nov 79) .....	47
'VNA' on Warsaw Meeting of News Agency Directors (VNA, 17 Nov 79) .....	48
Briefs	
Delegation to Czechoslovakia	49
Women's Delegation in Czechoslovakia	49
Intercosmos Conference	50
Delegation to GDR	50
Economic Control Conference	50
SRV at Writers' Conference	50
Greetings to UK Communists	50
Netherlands Envoy Departure	51



CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Indian Envoy	51
Japanese Marxists Received	51
WFDY Delegation	51
PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT	
Council of Ministers Decision on Distribution of Income (Hanoi Domestic Service, 14 Nov 79) .....	51
ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE	
'NHAN DAN' Editorial on Scales of Collective Organizations (Editorial; Hanoi Domestic Service, 9 Nov 79) .....	57
AGRICULTURE	
SRV Provinces Take Measures To Combat Drought (Hanoi Domestic Service, 13 Nov 79) .....	60
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION	
'NHAN DAN' Expresses Concern About Country's Coal Industry (Editorial; Hanoi Domestic Service, 12 Nov 79) ....	62
BIOGRAPHIC	
Information on Vietnamese Personalities .....	64

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### 'QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' ON APPLYING VCP'S MILITARY STRATEGY

BK140428 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Oct 79 p 3 BK

[Unattributed article: "Fully Understand the Party's Military Line and Tasks in the National Defense War"--passages between slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] To promote a profound understanding of the party's military line, viewpoint and thinking is a very important task of our political activities and is aimed at increasing the fighting strength of the people's armed forces.

The party's line is the primary factor deciding all victories of our armed forces and people. The party's military line is very correct and scientific, and our military art in the national defense war is very creative.

In the war for national liberation, guided by the party's correct military line, our people's armed forces strongly brought into play the offensive strategy, thereby achieving glorious victory over the U.S. aggressive forces. The party's current military line represents a new development of the military line of the liberation war in accordance with the new conditions of the national defense war. There is a difference in the nature and combat objectives between the liberation war and national defense war. For this reason, while learning from and improving on the experiences of the liberation war, our party has correctly developed a military line, a viewpoint and a concept of the national defense war, and has laid down for us a guideline of action so as to insure victory in any eventuality of war.

Our strategic military objectives in the national defense war against aggression are to annihilate enemy forces and destroy their war means along with defending our territory, our people and our economic installations and potentials on land, on water and on the seabed,... Enemy annihilation must be closely combined with territorial defense. Only by annihilating the enemy can we defend our territory. On the other hand, in order to annihilate the enemy, we must clearly understand the objective of territorial defense. Only in this way can our people's armed forces avoid attaching importance solely to enemy annihilation and closely combine enemy annihilation with the defense of our territorial integrity--

including our land, airspace and territorial waters--the defense of the lives and property of our people and the defense of our economic and cultural establishments.

These requirements stipulate that, to carry out combat assignments, our armed forces and people must develop the strength of the all-people, comprehensive war from the very beginning and be resolved to defeat the enemy in its war of aggression right along the border and coastline and on the offshore islands as well as in any area that is attacked by its troops. We must also annihilate as many enemy troops as possible and not allow them to occupy a single inch of our territory, kill a single civilian or destroy or loot even a scintilla of our property. All localities, units and categories of our troops, and people must resolutely hold fast to their positions to attack and annihilate enemy troops right on the spot in order to defend each village, road and production establishment.

The aforementioned combat requirements and duties require that the political task in the armed forces be conducted in a profound manner so as to help the soldiers to have correct views, thoughts and actions in conformity with the strategic determination and guidelines set by the party. These strategic guidelines reflect the fundamental character of the war to defend the socialist fatherland. They are also the rules and regulations for our armed forces and people to insure inevitable victory in the war, which all cadres, soldiers and units should understand thoroughly and put into practice in building their forces and in fighting.

[BK140431] It is most important to adhere to /the concept of offensive strategy/ This strategic concept constitutes our party's most fundamental military concept. It thoroughly reflects the revolutionary nature of the working class. At the same time, it is also the Vietnamese people's traditional military concept, as noted by Comrade Le Duan: "In our nation's history, each time our people rose up against foreign aggression, we have always resorted to offensive strategy and not defensive strategy. We attacked the enemy to defend our country. Offense is a strategy while defense is merely a strategem."\* Our concept of offensive strategy in today's national defense war is established on a new basis--the socialist regime which is being gradually built and developed ever more steadily and strongly throughout the country, a country which has achieved total independence and unification and whose powerful armed forces have been forged through long ordeals and have heroically defeated the big imperialists' aggressor armies.

Adhering to the concept of offensive strategy in the war of self-defense at a time when the laboring people have gained the right to mastery over the country means to combine this concept with the /implementation of the guideline on the strategy of mastery and offense and the strategy of offense and mastery/. This strategic guideline is the creative application

\* /Let youth in the armed forces surge forward and struggle for the revolutionary ideal and take the lead in the anti-U.S. national salvation cause/, the Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1969, p 30.

of the concept of socialist collective mastery in the party's socialist revolutionary line to the military field and the national defense task. Implementing this strategic guideline means to develop the great strength of the system of collective mastery and the combined strength of all of the forces of the all-people national defense and to apply all creative combat tactics developed by all forces and combat organizations. Only then will we successfully carry out the people's war to defend the fatherland.

All of our armed forces and people have exercised the right to mastery in the national defense task, over the entire country and each locality and even within such grassroots units as cooperatives, state farms, worksites, enterprises, organs, villages, hamlets, towns and city wards.... We have also exercised the right to mastery over all districts, provinces, regions and sections of the country. In view of this, we must actively exercise the right to mastery right on the frontline, along the border and coastal areas, and on offshore islands as well as in any place that is attacked by the enemy; stalwartly hold on to our positions in every battlefield and locality by implementing the motto "not to abandon one inch or give up 1 millimeter of territory" in order to resolutely attack and annihilate as many enemy troops as possible; and not allow them to penetrate deep into our territory by dealing them thundering blows to smash their attacks from the very beginning of the war. At the same time, we must stand ready to completely defeat the enemy should it obstinately try to prolong and escalate its war of aggression. In this way, no matter how many prongs and no matter from which direction the aggressors launch the offensive against our country, they will certainly encounter the all-people, comprehensive, the local people's war, and the war conducted by our regular army corps. They will throw themselves up against the steel wall of an entire people who have upheld the sense of mastery over their country and over all battlefields and localities to resolutely attack the aggressors and deal them appropriate punishing blows as well as to smash all enemy schemes, thereby fulfilling the strategic objectives of the national defense war.

[BK150439] In view of the abovementioned strategic guidelines, it is necessary for us to devise firm tactics to maintain mastery before the outbreak of a war in accordance with a unified combat plan. Only with a firm tactic to maintain mastery can we attack the enemy from a position of strength, dealing destructive blows to the enemy from the very first battle and at the very first line of resistance. Only with a well-prepared people's warfare strategy can we maintain mastery and attack the enemy at the very first line, and can we annihilate the bulk of the enemy force and smash the enemy attacks right from the start. Our combat power should be reflected at the very first line, at the very first battle and at the very initial stages of the war. This stationary power should, together with the power of the entire country, defeat the enemy at the first line.

If, in the liberation war, attacking was considered a main form of combat, in the war of national defense we should apply the tactics of attacking, counterattacking and defending and should associate them together, using one tactic to support another. Every force and every category of troops must be skilled in attacking, counterattacking and defending. Those in

the frontline as well as those in the rear must also be skilled in attacking, counterattacking and defending. Defensive combat must be active, persistent and resolute and must reflect the offensive concept and a will to object to negative and passive defense. Along with positive defense, it is mandatory to carry out positive, creative and continuous counterattacks and attacks with the use of appropriate forces at the right time and on various scales--large, medium and small. It is mandatory to adopt numerous dynamic and creative attacking methods which fully reflect such principles as attacking to destroy, attacking with high efficiency, developing our advantages in resourcefulness and ferocity, combining the power of all kinds of weapons at hand, combining small-, medium- and large-scale attacks, guaranteeing creative, positive, secret, surprise, mobile and flexible factors, always maintaining a position of strength from which to attack the enemy, using a small force to defeat a much larger enemy force, using quality of defeat a much larger enemy force, and launching vigorous attacks while satisfactorily carrying out military proselyting activities.

Our war of national defense is carried out through the two basic methods: local people's warfare and the war with the use of mobile regular army corps.

Local people's warfare plays a very important strategic role and possesses a tremendous strength with districts already being built into military bastions--part of the whole defensive system of provinces and cities, with provinces and cities already being built into very strong strategic units, with new potentials in manpower and material assets and in the strength of the people and of the local armed forces already being created, and with the tactic to maintain mastery already being devised for the grassroots level. On-the-spot local people's warfare is considered the most mobile as it is capable of intercepting, counterattacking and attacking in a most timely manner, and of annihilating the enemy, maintaining mastery, and attacking the enemy at any time and anywhere regardless of whether the enemy uses infantry or strategic air raids against us at the frontline or deep in the rear area. Local people's warfare offers us numerous ways to attack the enemy.

[BK150642] War with the use of mobile regular army corps also plays a very important strategic role and is of decisive significance in destroying large chunks of the enemy's personnel strength and safeguarding vital strategic areas in defense of the fatherland. These elite regular army corps with powerful punches can deliver decisive blows, effecting a change in the balance of stationary forces to the advantage of the friendly side. They can operate in close coordination with local people's warfare to achieve mastery and destroy the enemy throughout the country, especially in important strategic areas.

While at war, we must satisfactorily apply and closely combine the two most basic strategic combat methods and must develop to the fullest the power of these two combat methods in order to defeat all aggressions. The



political task is therefore aimed at making every force--regardless of whether it is mobile regular force or self-defense militia force and whether it is combat force or combat support force--fully aware of these two basic strategic combat methods and at having every force and everyone, on the basis of mastering these basic combat methods, vigorously develop a sense of responsibility and initiative in order to satisfactorily fulfill all assigned missions in the common strategy, always uphold the spirit of unity and coordination and a determination to score collective combat exploits, readily take up difficult works, leaving easy ones for friends; and to realize the slogan "all for the common victory of the battlefield." The political task is aimed not only at insuring thorough knowledge of the party's line and its military concept on the theoretical aspect but also at influencing all those practical activities of the armed forces involving organizations, unit-building, training and logistic support. The political task must also be deeply involved in each category of military operations, in each form of tactics, in each battle conducted by each armed service, each combat branch and each category of troops. This is to satisfactorily settle all problems regarding fighting determination and ideological, military and organizational concepts; and to realize the fighting determination and the party's military concept in order to inspect troops organizationally, and to detect in time erroneous manifestations in their ideological concept and in their actions which are considered as unsuitable to the party's military concept. It is necessary to use regular sessions held to draw experiences as a means to detect specific strong points and shortcomings in order to continue to teach and make the troops and cadres more and more aware of the party's line and its military concept.

CSO: 4209

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### EDITORIAL DETAILS COMMANDER SYSTEM WITHIN ARMY

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 9, Sep 79 pp 1-11

[Editorial: "Implementing the Commander System Well Within the Vietnamese People's Army"]

[Text] Once the party sets forth the correct political and military lines and tasks for each stage, each period, organizational work becomes the factor of decisive importance in the successful implementation of these lines and tasks. Organizational work must be performed skillfully, must increasingly reflect the revolutionary and scientific nature of the party in order to transform the line of the party into revolutionary actions of the masses, into real victory. An organization of a revolutionary and scientific nature is always consistent with the objective laws of development, is improved and changed in a timely fashion and fully meets the requirements of the revolutionary struggle. This organization must have clearly defined responsibilities, tight regulations and strict discipline and everyone within the organization must be closely linked in one will and action in order to successfully implement the lines and policies of the party. In each stage of the revolution, when the political and military lines and tasks develop, organizational work must develop accordingly.

Within our army, the building and constant strengthening of the leadership system and command system are a very important task in organizational work. The resolution of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee on implementing the commander system is designed to insure that the command system of our army develops to meet the requirements of the tasks of the revolution and the tasks of the army in a manner consistent with the organizational growth and the development in every area of our armed forces, in general, and the corps of party cadres within the army, in particular.

In the more than 30 years of victory and growth of the army and in a manner closely linked to the development of the revolutionary forces in accordance with the line of the party in the various stages, the leadership system and

command system within our army have been established, built, developed and constantly perfected by the party.

During the first years of the revolution, in the face of the requirements of the revolutionary situation and task at that time, our party, in the movements of 1930 and 1931, the pinnacle of which was the Nghe-Tinh Soviet, organized self-defense units of workers and farmers. The first thing the party did in establishing these self-defense units was to immediately establish their working class nature; at the same time, it issued regulations on the leadership system and command system of these units. Together with establishing the system of unit commanders and deputy commanders, the party clearly stipulated that all units from squad level upward must have a representative of the communist party or the command. "The unit commanders and party representatives must cooperate in commanding the unit. In their daily actions, they must obey their party organization. In their general military activities, they must obey the next higher self-defense echelon and the corresponding military committee of the party."(1)

Between 1940 and 1945, in the face of the requirements of the national liberation movement, in preparation for the general uprising to seize political power and on the basis of the revolutionary struggle being waged by the masses, the party decided to establish the Ba Son guerrilla unit, the Vietnam Liberation Army propaganda unit, the Ba To guerrilla unit, the Nam Ky guerrilla army and so forth, which were the forerunners of the Vietnamese People's Army. As soon as these armed organizations were established, and in the course of their development, the party constantly built the revolutionary nature and established the leadership system and command system of these units. The party organized the system of political officers within the units of the liberation army.

With the victory of the August Revolution in 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born and, along with this leap forward in the development of the revolution, the people's armed forces grew rapidly and became the armed forces of a country, a nation. In view of the facts that the army had grown rapidly, the number of party members within the army was very small, many command cadres were not party members and the qualifications of cadres were, generally speaking low but the task of the army at that time was the very complex and difficult task of joining all the people in fighting enemies, both foreign and domestic, the party gave the authority to make every decision in units from the regimental level upwards to the political officer.

In 1952, when the war of resistance against the French entered a new stage of development and the scale of the utilization of combat forces broadened, the qualifications of cadres improved somewhat and the party decided to establish the system of commanders and political officers, who discharge their duties under the collective leadership of the party committees on the various levels (the party chapters). Our army has continued to implement this system of leadership and command.



Thus, over the past 30 years and more, in the development of the revolutionary forces in keeping with the political line and task and the military line and task, the organizational work and the leadership and command systems within the army have developed and been constantly improved.

In the new stage of the revolution, the entire nation of Vietnam faces the extremely important historic task of making every effort to build socialism and protect the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. Our people must strengthen their national defense forces, maintain combat readiness, defeat every enemy aggressor, firmly protect the fatherland and fulfill their noble international obligation.

In order to work with all the people towards the successful performance of these tasks, we must continue to accelerate the buildup of the people's armed forces, the building of a regular-force, modern, well trained people's army that is strong enough to defeat every enemy in any type of war of aggression with whatever weapons they are armed.

This situation and task make it both necessary and possible to suitably improve our organizational work and the command system within the army. The report summarizing the building of the party and the revision of party statutes at the 4th Congress of the Party pointed out: "Now that our army and its cadres have grown, it is necessary to implement very well the system of collective leadership of the party committee in conjunction with implementing the commander system in accordance with the stipulations of the Party Central Committee."

Therefore, the decision by the Central Military Party Committee to organize the implementation of the commander system within our army was not based on subjective desires, but on the inevitable, objective development of the revolution, of the army.

In order to thoroughly implement the principle of democratic centralism and the basic organizational principles of the party in the development of the leadership system and command system of the people's armed forces, our party has emphasized "the successful implementation of the collective leadership system of the party committee in conjunction with the implementation of the commander system." The commander system within the army is designed to insure the commander's fulfillment of his personal responsibilities, heighten the command and management effectiveness of the commander, organize the good implementation of the resolutions of the party committee and successfully complete each task of the unit. This will strengthen the collective leadership of the party committee, increase its effectiveness and insure that the leadership and command systems are always closely coordinated within one entity, thereby insuring the absolute, direct leadership of the party in every aspect of army operations.

Therefore, to implement the commander system well, we must simultaneously heighten both the collective leadership role of the party committee and the ability of the commander to command, manage and organize implementation in order to cause our army to rapidly mature in a manner consistent with the political and military tasks in the new stage, consistent with the organization, equipment and material-technical bases of the people's armed forces that are constantly being developed, consistent with the new scale of warfare of the regular-force, modern people's army in a war to protect the fatherland.

The commander will display the full spirit of responsibility of the cadre, the party member to the work of the party and will devote his creative talents, his thoughts, determination and willingness to work and assume responsibility to winning the largest and most timely victory possible for the unit.

Focusing command and management responsibilities in one person insures a centralized, unified command and avoids the problem of poorly defined responsibilities, which leads to the lack of responsibility, to stagnation and reliance upon others. As analyzed by Lenin, "within the army, this irresponsibility inevitably leads to casualties, to chaos and panic, to the decentralization of authority, to defeat." (2) Therefore, as the resolution of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee states: "The commander must be responsible to the upper level, to the collective on his level, to his entire unit for the results of the performance of the military, political, rear service, technical and economic tasks as well as the progress of his unit, for the material, spiritual and cultural lives of all cadres, soldiers, manual workers and personnel under his authority."

The commander system of our army is totally different from the commander system within the armies of the capitalist countries, the armies of the exploiting classes. It is based on the interests of the army, the party and the country and is consistent with the nature and the laws of development of our state, our army. It is closely linked to the leadership system of the party within the army.

To insure the party's absolute, direct leadership of every aspect of army operations, our army has both the leadership system of the party and the command system on the various levels. The leadership system of the party is collective leadership; collective leadership must go hand in hand with personal responsibility; the leadership organization must be constantly built and improved to insure adherence to the principle of collective leadership. The command system within our army is the commander system; the commander must be under the collective leadership of the party committee; the command organization must constantly be built and improved to insure that the commander always completes his mission as defined by his duties and insure that the collective leadership of the party committee is strengthened.

The implementation of the commander system plays a positive role in stimulating every aspect of the combat, buildup and work of our army; however, the implementation of this system is not without difficulties and certain problems, especially in the beginning. Because, the capabilities and qualities of some of our cadres do not meet requirements in some areas. We gained very valuable experiences regarding the command system during the war of liberation. However, if we stop at these experiences, we could easily become empirical and not see that things are always changing and developing or easily make short-sighted mistakes in our thinking, viewpoints and actions. In addition, the habits of the small-scale producer, the lack of organization, centralization and unity, the hesitancy to operate under a tight, strict plan and so forth have also had an effect upon more than a few of our cadres. All of these factors might pose obstacles to the implementation of the commander system, to the completion of the unit's task.

However, if each of us, on the basis of common interests, the interests of the revolution, displays a high spirit of responsibility, devotes his mind and will to serving the people, serving the army, is determined to fight for the independence and freedom of the fatherland, for socialism and always maintains a selfless and faithful attitude, development will be normal. Everything will fall into place, everyone will rapidly become accustomed to this new change. The fighting strength of our army will constantly be increased and the abilities of our cadres will constantly develop. Conversely, if we take a different viewpoint, even if we temporarily adopt one that is slightly different, and do not comply with the principles governing the leadership system and the command system, it might lead to problems and adversely affect our work, affect the progress and the completion of the task of the unit as well as each person.

Implementing the commander system means bringing about a change in the command system, not in the leadership system. However, because the leadership system and the command system constitute one entity, when changing the command system, the commander must, on the basis of adhering to the principles mentioned above, establish the correct relationships in order to fulfill the new duties of the commander well and constantly increase the effectiveness of both the leadership organization and the command organization.

In the relationship between the commander and the party committee, between the commander and the agency on the upper level, the commander must scrupulously comply with the resolutions of the party committee and the orders and directives of the commander on the upper level and follow the guidance of the command staff, political staff, rear service staff and technical staff on the upper level. When receiving a decision from the party committee or an order or directive from the upper level, the commander must thoroughly study it and, on the basis of what is involved in his work as well as his duties, propose ways to the party committee on his level to implement them. At the same time, he himself must organize, inspect and supervise their implementation and report on the results of this implementation.

The relationship between the commander and the party committee on his level is the relationship between the person being led and the leadership level, between the organization the commander has to implement, command and manage and the leadership of the party committee. The party committee provides this leadership by means of resolutions and through the scheduled and unscheduled activities of its collective. The party committee discusses and decides the leadership guidelines, positions and measures but does not become involved in work related to the command duties of the commander. On the basis of the resolutions of the party committee, the commander begins performing his various jobs in a dynamic and creative spirit; when necessary, he seeks the opinions of the party committee; however, he does not lean on the party committee nor is he afraid to accept responsibility. Whether or not it is necessary to ask the opinions of the party committee depends upon the nature and specifics of the work at hand, upon the requirements of each combat and construction task, upon the victory and progress of the unit and upon the sense of respect for the collective leadership of the party committee, of always placing the interests of the collective, the army and the revolution above everything else. The commander has the responsibility of preparing for the party committee conference and, when making these preparations, he must differentiate in content as well as form, between proposals of the party committee conference and combat orders and work directives to the lower level. In the process of preparing for the conference, he should exchange opinions first with the lower level and with other comrades on the party committee to insure unanimity. If, during the conference, there is the need for debate to differentiate between right and wrong the commander should not express an attitude that sets him apart from the other members of the committee as the commander.

The commander is usually a party committee member, he might or might not be its secretary; in either case, during the conference of the party committee the commander must occupy the correct position, must not confuse the position of the commander at a cadre conference with the position of a party committee member at a party committee conference. In the practice of criticism and self-criticism by the party committee, the commander must be humble and exemplary in his practice of self-criticism.

The relationship between the commander and his deputy commanders is the relationship between the highest person in command of the unit and the persons that assist him, the relationship between the upper level and the lower level, a relationship based on the principle the lower level obeys the upper level. On the other hand, besides the relationship between the upper level and the lower level, the commander and his deputy commanders need a sacred relationship to serve as the basis of their closeness to one another. This is the relationship of comradeship, of comrades-in-arms who live and die together, who help and support one another, who work together to complete their task. The commander must possess good political skills, possess an open, proper style and never abuse his authority, wish to display his personal power or usurp the authority of others. He must truly discuss and exchange opinions



with his deputy commanders, wholeheartedly help them for the sake of immediate as well as long-range interests, create and maintain the conditions, including the prestige of deputy commanders, to fulfill their duties well and, in this manner, insure their growth and development.

As regards the deputy commander in charge of politics, the commander must use the role this person plays as a specialist in party work, in political work, but must not rely upon him or leave everything up to him. The commander is the highest person in command of the unit and must assume responsibility for both the policy regarding and the results of party work and political work, in general, throughout the unit. The commander must create the conditions for and help the deputy commander in charge of politics to assess the overall situation in every area of the unit so that he can perform party work and political work with a high degree of effectiveness.

The relationship between the commander and the command staff, political staff, rear service staff and technical staff is the relationship between the commander and the agencies that assist him, between the commander and his subordinates. The commander must attach importance to training the staffs in military, political and specialized subjects as well as work style; he must utilize these staffs in accordance with their duties and tasks and must organize close coordination among the various staffs.

As regards the political staff, the commander must consider guiding this staff, guiding the performance of party work and political work to be part of his duties; he should not consider this to only be the responsibility of the deputy commander in charge of politics. He must concern himself with cultivating and properly utilizing the role played by the political staff, thereby helping to stimulate every other aspect of work within the unit in exact accordance with the lines and viewpoints of the party, the resolutions of the party committee and the orders and directives of the commander.

In his relationship with the mass of cadres and soldiers and with the mass organizations within the unit, the commander, as the highest person in command within the unit, must know how to command the entire unit, to issue precise orders, to mobilize, educate and organize the entire unit so that it successfully completes each task. He must consider the mass organizations to be his competent arm in command activities.

The commander and his unit must be one; the commander must blend with the mass of cadres and soldiers, must respect and uphold the right of collective ownership of each person, must maintain strict discipline, must insure that the entire unit is a single bloc. The commander must be very strict but, at the same time, he must be very understanding and generous. He must truly be fully concerned with the material and spiritual lives of his troops, must

wholeheartedly love his cadres and soldiers, must respect each person and must prohibit every act of militarism that violates the dignity of his cadre and soldiers. He must insure that the entire unit sees in the commander the qualifications of a commander within the revolutionary army, a comrade, a close comrade-in-arms.

The commander is a person trusted by the party and state, is the person who implements the lines, positions and policies of the party and state, is the person who is responsible to the people, the party, the upper level and the entire unit for every aspect of his unit's work as well as each of its successes, each of its strengths and weaknesses. The commander who wants to excellently fulfill his duties and tasks must first possess all the necessary talents and qualities; at the same time, he must know how to coordinate with the various cadres within the unit; this corps of cadres must possess good qualifications, capabilities and qualities and must work together to create a unified, highly effective leadership and command structure throughout the unit.

Therefore, constantly improving the capabilities and qualities of cadres, in general, and the commander, in particular, is a decisive prerequisite to successfully implementing the commander system.

The revolution is a process of continuous development and the requirements of the revolutionary task become increasingly high and complex. In each new stage, besides the advantages we have in our favor, new difficulties are inevitable. The present revolutionary situation and tasks require that our army be built into a well trained army that is strong politically, militarily and technically, strong in its rear services, strong in its ideology and organization, strong in each unit and throughout the army. The strength of the army lies in its organization; the strength of each person lies in organization; through the activities of the various organizations within the army, each cadre and soldier is trained to be new socialist persons, to be skilled cadres and outstanding, revolutionary military personnel. Only with a strong organization can man be strong; conversely, strong people help to build strong organizations.

The correct leadership system and command system will create the conditions for the corps of cadres to grow. When our cadres, in general, and our commanders, in particular, are truly persons who possess good qualities and well developed skills, are truly strong persons, the leadership system and command system of our army are strengthened even more.

Therefore, to implement the commander system within the army, we must adopt long-term and short-term cadre planning and build a corps of cadres that has received thorough training, that operates on a regular basis and that is of suitable size and high quality. Every possible step must be taken by us to organize education and training for cadres, to constantly heighten their

abilities, qualities and overall level of knowledge so that each of our cadres on every level and in every sector possesses the correct stand, the correct thinking, possesses high revolutionary zeal, a strong will to fight and is skilled in organizational work and action.

The commander must be able to command and tightly manage troops, know how to build a strong unit and know how to organize the performance of work so that he has the ability to discharge the responsibility of a commander on the various levels within the army. In particular, the higher a cadre's position is, the more he must try to learn, to forge himself, to constantly raise his qualifications in every respect in order to promptly meet the requirements of the revolution, the army. This matter is a very important one because, without comprehensive knowledge, without military and political skills, a military mistake could lead to a military defeat or a political mistake could lead to a military defeat of immeasurable proportions.

The abilities and qualities of a cadre are not natural assets, rather, they are acquired through training, through study, through forging. Therefore, our cadres must make every effort to learn, must consider learning to be a political responsibility of each person. We must learn throughout our lives. We must learn from persons on the upper level, learn from persons on our level, learn from persons on the lower level, learn from teachers, from friends, from books, learn from our work, learn from the revolutionary struggle. Every failure to take steps to learn and all study that is superficial and perfunctory in nature and fails to yield significant results not only retard the progress of each cadre, but also cause the unit to encounter difficulties in its buildup and combat, even sometimes to fail to fulfill its task. To stop moving forward in the armed struggle, to consider the experiences that everyone has accumulated to be sufficient, to be unwilling to move forward to meet the requirements of the new situation and tasks are harmful to oneself, harmful to the unit of which one is in charge.

To insure that the commander system within our army is a sound and highly effective system, the commander must be truly strong politically and ideologically, must have broad and comprehensive knowledge of military affairs, politics, economics, science and technology, must have a firm grasp of the fundamentals of the political line and task and the military line and task of the party, must possess high fighting spirit and be able to perform his work well. In all of his activities, the commander must always adhere to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, firmly adhere to the working class stand and be determined to victoriously implement the lines and positions of the party. By means of the revolutionary world view and methodology and the science of Marxism-Leninism, he must correctly analyze the nature, schemes and tricks of the enemy and see the laws of the development of society, of the revolution, of war and the armed struggle in the present age in our country as well as the world. On this basis, he can discern the nature of complex phenomena and

realize the new, specific and increasingly high requirements he faces in all the military and political work he must perform. On this basis, he must reach correct conclusions, make accurate, revolutionary and scientific decisions and move his unit constantly forward to success in the buildup of the unit and victory in combat.

Correctly understanding the importance of the work assigned to him by the fatherland, the party and the government, the commander must always give his attention to studying to deepen his knowledge and improve his ability to take action in order to perform every job that he must undertake well, including: military, political, rear service and technical jobs and managing and commanding troops in training, combat and construction. To accomplish this, he must have deep knowledge of all areas in order to keep pace with the developments of military science and art and modern military technology in a war to protect the fatherland and, at the same time, meet the new requirements of the education and training of troops, especially at a time when the cultural, scientific and technical levels of our cadres and troops are constantly being raised. The commander must forge and constantly heighten a spirit of dynamism and independence in every aspect of his work, activities and combat, especially combat. In every situation, even when engaged in combat and it becomes necessary for troops to take rapid action but no order has been received from the upper level assigning the unit a new mission, the commander must be ready to accept the responsibility for his decisions and must find the best possible ways to complete his task and take action in a manner consistent with the intentions of the upper level.

Courage, bravery, tenacity and self-confidence are very important attributes that the commander must possess. These virtues, together with the commander's skill at commanding troops, have a very positive impact upon the lower level, upon soldiers in combat. Trust in the commander and confidence in the knowledge and ability of the commander are one of the factors leading to the victory of the unit. Therefore, on the basis of studying and learning the military line, viewpoints and thinking of the party, the revolutionary situation and tasks and the tasks of the army and on the basis of forging himself in the realities of combat, the commander must routinely concern himself with constantly heightening his revolutionary determination, his will to fight and his abilities.

Today, the material bases, technical bases and equipment of the army are being strengthened and improved with each passing day. The commander must manage and use a very large volume of material-technical equipment assigned by the state to the unit. The commander must train his unit in all these various types of weapons and equipment. Therefore, the commander must study, learn and be able to use these weapons and pieces of equipment, must learn how to manage and maintain them well and prevent them from being sloppily used and poorly maintained so that they do not break, become lost or be downgraded. This is a very pressing requirement. If we are not thoroughly familiar with



and are not proficient in the use of weapons and equipment, if we do not maintain them well, we will be unable to be the masters of modern military technology when war breaks out and will not have enough weapons to fight. And, we can also not talk about being the masters of the battlefield, the masters of the skies, the ocean waters, the mainland.

Iron discipline, self-imposed, strict discipline is a very important factor of the fighting strength of our army. The commander must symbolize the very high sense of organization and discipline of the entire unit and must be the person who assumes weighty responsibility in training and managing troops in the area of discipline. He must insure that the activities, studies and work of troops are maintained on a regular basis in accordance with orders and regulations. Particular importance must be attached to constantly heightening the spirit of fully complying with the code of discipline in the maintenance of combat readiness to insure that the entire unit possesses but one will, is always able to fight well, goes when ordered and wins victory in combat.

Another very important matter in forging the capabilities and qualities of the commander is the need to always attach importance to improving his ability to unite the entire unit. The command cadre, the leader must be the nucleus of unity, must rally the corps of cadres and the entire unit around himself in order to overcome difficulties and excellently complete every task. Unity is not merely an ideological issue, it also demands the ability to organize and unite the unit in order to take action and win victory. To accomplish this, the cadre, primarily command cadres and leadership cadres, must set an example of humility; in combat, they must face and overcome difficulties and challenges; in victory, they must attribute the victory to the party, the people, the armed forces. The system of leadership and the command system cannot survive without unity, cannot survive amongst paternalism, bureaucracy or arbitrariness. There are many reasons why such phenomena occur; they sometimes occur because the commander is not dedicated or faithful or does not base his actions on the interests of the revolution or the resolutions of the party committee. Meanwhile, collective leadership is marked by a lack of seriousness and closeness, the failure to fully comply with principles and regulations and the failure to wage an active struggle to overcome things that are in error.

Our army has won very valuable experience, namely, that the commanders on the various levels, primarily on the upper level, make every effort to learn, exchange experiences and actively train and create the conditions for their deputy commanders to mature in every respect so that they are able to perform their jobs and take the place of commanders in all circumstances. From now on, in the course of implementing the commander system, training successors is a matter of extreme importance. This is the responsibility, the obligation of the commanders on the various levels. It is a source of happiness to train a corps of cadres and train successors who are more talented than you, who are better than your generation. And, this is also a standard for evaluating each

cadres, in general, and each commander, in particular. This responsibility must be seriously discharged under a specific plan and in the spirit of serving the interests of the revolution; it must not be discharged in a perfunctory manner, not by way of doing a favor for cadres or not by praising one another to the point that cadres become adversely affected.

The commander system is an important and new matter to our army. It is not in opposition to the system of collective leadership of the party committee within our army, rather, it helps to strengthen the effectiveness of this leadership. We must research, grasp and fully implement the commander system in exact accordance with the directive of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee and the plan set forth by the Political General Department.

We must immediately begin planning the deployment, assignment and training of cadres on the various levels so that they are able to perform their task. Cadres must be deployed and assigned on the basis of standards, that is, on the basis of their abilities and qualities. Once they have been assigned, a plan must be adopted for providing them with advanced training and we must be determined to achieve success in this effort. We must adopt a complete plan, one with long-range guidelines and jobs that must gradually be performed, and must fully examine the special characteristics and the nature of each unit in order to assign each unit a suitable plan. We must closely coordinate ideological work with organizational work. Importance must be attached to detailed organizational work on each level and within each unit.

In work that is brand new, it is impossible to avoid problems and shortcomings. However, we must try to display many strongpoints and avoid unnecessary shortcomings. Once we have organized the implementation of this system, we must routinely conduct reviews and gain experience in order to constantly improve the commander system established by the party so that it truly represents a new factor and in order to strengthen the leadership and command systems, thereby making a positive contribution to improving the quality and increasing the fighting strength of our army.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Military Proceedings of the Party, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1969, p 118.
2. Lenin: "Complete Works," Volume 39, p 53, Vietnamese version, Progress Publishing House, Moscow, 1977.

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### NEW AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 9, Sep 79 pp 22-30

[Article by Major General Hoang Van Khanh: "Several Matters Relating to the Combat Operations of Air Defense Troops"]

[Text] The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists suffered a heavy defeat in their war of aggression against our country; however, they have not abandoned their scheme of annexing Vietnam in order to eventually carry out their scheme to be the rulers of the world. Displaying high vigilance and the determination to protect the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, our army and people are making active preparations to defeat every act of aggression by the enemy employing larger forces and more cruel and insidious tricks, including their mobilization of a very large air force to carry out a surprise strategic raid against our political, economic and national defense centers and the landing of troops by air in our rear area. This air raid and this landing of troops might occur before, at the same time as or after they launch a war of aggression in order to coordinate with attacks by their ground and naval forces. They might also conduct independent air raids to destroy our nerve centers, our important economic installations, national defense installations and political and cultural centers, thereby posing difficulties to us in our building of the country in a vain attempt to weaken us and eventually annex our country. Conducting a surprise air attack and a landing of troops by air in the country of the opposition is also a law to which imperialists and reactionaries adhere in modern wars of aggression.

Fully aware of this insidious scheme of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, the air defense troops, together with the air force and the other branches, services and forces, are maintaining a high level of combat readiness, determined to deliver a massive annihilating blow at the very outset and defeat a strategic air raid and airborne assault by the enemy, thereby helping to protect each success of socialist construction, protect the people and protect the fatherland.

Combat operations against a strategic air raid by the enemy and combat operations against airborne landings are governed by separate laws and requirements, but these two types of combat operations are very closely related. Combat operations against an airborne assault by the enemy require the combat coordination of many of our forces on the ground as soon as the enemy's troops land. However, when conducting an airborne assault, the enemy must employ a very large air force to transport their troops, clear landing sites and coordinate with these troops once they have landed. In this case, it is necessary to destroy very many aircraft, especially troop transports, and kill or injure many enemy troops before they touch the ground. Therefore, in combat against strategic air raids and against airborne landings, air defense troops have a major responsibility. Combat operations against strategic air raids and airborne landings in a war to protect the fatherland must fully reflect revolutionary-offensive thinking in offensive actions under very thorough and determined objectives. The operations have the purpose of destroying the assault forces of the enemy, promptly and rapidly thwarting their air attacks and firmly protecting targets of strategic political, military and economic significance. They help to protect manpower and materiel, protect our rear area and maintain communications between the rear area and the frontlines. These combat operations also help to thwart the scheme of the enemy to partition, surround or strategically isolate us by means of coordinating airborne landings in the rear area with attacks by land and naval forces. They also help to insure that our people can coordinate production with combat in the course of the war.

Combat operations against strategic air raids and airborne landings by the enemy will be carried out under the new conditions and with the new capabilities of the country. Our country is totally independent and free, has a vast rear area with a complete organizational structure and increasingly large material-technical bases and the economy of our country is in the process of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production. This has created new capabilities to be employed in combat operations against enemy air raids and raises the new and very high requirement of very firmly protecting this vast rear area, a rear area that encompasses many very important strategic targets and very large forces. We have the new strength of the unprecedented people's war based on the strong foundation of socialism now being built throughout the country, built with the system of collective ownership, the new economy, the new culture and the new man. This strength is evident in the strategic deployment to protect the fatherland within each village, district, province and municipality and throughout the country, upon which air defense forces can rely in order to create a very strong and effective battle position against the enemy. The air defense capabilities of our fatherland have also grown very much. The air force, the air defense troops and the air defense forces of the three military elements have grown, have gained much combat experience and possess increasingly strong fighting strength. The air defense service, which has a major responsibility to the nation for countering strategic air raids by the enemy, has undergone extraordinary growth and has the ability to complete its task well in defeating strategic air raids and

airborne landings by the enemy. We must be fully aware of the capabilities and favorable conditions that now exist so that we make every effort to fully utilize them and create both a strong position and strong forces in the combat operations of the air defense troops.

Combat operations against strategic air raids and airborne landings are only highly effective when we know how to rely upon the strong development of the people's war and closely coordinate it with the other modes of strategic warfare in a war to protect our fatherland. On the basis of firmly grasping the basic viewpoints of the party concerning a war to protect the fatherland, the air defense troops must be determined to take the initiative and promptly smash strategic air raids and every other type of air raid and airborne landing by the enemy, regardless of the direction from which they come, the scale of attack, the timing of the attack, smash them by using our greatest possible strength, the combined strength of all forces, branches, types of weapons and technical equipment, especially modern technical equipment, firmly protect the political, economic and cultural centers of the country, military installations, communications hubs and other important targets throughout our territory, fight the enemy in conjunction with concealing our defenses, using camouflage, using decoys to deceive the enemy and so forth.

To fulfill their mission of defeating a strategic air raid and airborne landing by the enemy, the air defense troops must fully understand and successfully implement the following several matters pertaining to combat operations and the buildup of forces:

1. They must tightly manage the air space of the fatherland, raise their level of combat readiness and fight the enemy promptly and strongly in every situation.

Aggressor armies always try to achieve the element of surprise in strategic air raids in a vain attempt to rapidly suppress the air defense forces of the opposition and destroy targets. They employ many tricks to deceive the opposition, act with secrecy and rapidity and employ many technical measures to achieve this objective.

For this reason, of utmost importance in combat operations against enemy air raids and airborne landings is to not be taken by surprise by massive and lightning-like strategic air raids by the enemy. To accomplish this, we must tightly manage our air space in order to promptly and accurately detect every phenomenon indicating air attack plans or actual air attacks by the enemy and take the initiative and fight the enemy. In particular, we must tightly manage the air space in those directions in which we think the enemy will conduct strategic air raids and airborne landings.

Our air defense forces have the experience of winning victory over a strong air force of the aggressor army of the U.S. imperialists. However, this does



permit us to complacently underestimate the air force of the Peking reactionaries. It must be remembered that although they have different strengths and weaknesses, all aggressors are wicked, crafty and cruel. Determining what the enemy is doing in the sky is a difficult job, a job made even more difficult when we underestimate the enemy.

It is necessary to improve the quality of the observer, reporting and alert system to be consistent with the requirements of combat operations to defeat a strategic air raid and airborne landing by the enemy. This system must be a very complete one, must be able to accurately detect enemy aircraft while they are still far away, primarily aircraft en route to strategic targets and other means of air attack of the enemy at every altitude, in every type of weather and during both the day and the night. We must utilize the full capacity of all optical and electronic means, radar stations and observer stations of the air defense troops, the air defense troops of the three military elements, the air force and the navy, among which radar forces are the primary force conducting reconnaissance and reporting on the enemy situation in the air. In terms of quantity and quality, of personnel and equipment, reconnaissance and reporting forces must be assembled to tightly guard the air space over important strategic targets. Each unit and each military corps must be assigned the responsibility of tightly managing the air space within a specific zone. We must strictly maintain the orderly system, the registration system, air situation report procedures and uniform notification and alert procedures through the service and our armed forces.

The tight management of air space must achieve the ultimate objective of reaching relatively accurate and timely conclusions concerning indications of a possible strategic air attack by the enemy: the time of the attack, the scale of forces employed, the direction of the attack or airborne landing, the targets of the attack, the site of the airborne landing and the tricks of the enemy's air assault and airborne landing. This job, which is not an easy one, must be organized and carried out through the intelligence of the collective, through the results of assessing the situation on an hourly and daily basis, etc. It is necessary to coordinate observing the situation on a regular basis with assessing the situation at the very time the enemy is expected to attack.

Together with the above, we must heighten the quality of combat readiness of the various units and military corps. Troops must maintain the highest possible state of combat readiness, especially those military corps tasked with protecting important targets. The entirety of the combat readiness of these units and military corps must insure that strong attacks can be directed against the primary formation of the enemy at the very outset, thereby rapidly smashing their assault and preventing them from destroying targets, from inflicting heavy losses of materiel and manpower upon us. The organization of combat alert forces, the establishment of combat readiness regulations and the establishment of organizational and command regulations must be designed to

meet these requirements well through specific plans and a specific organization within each area of operation. Of importance is the need to view the maintenance of combat readiness within the air defense forces as a continuous process that occurs without regard for the day, hour, season or month. Therefore, we must conduct very thorough inspections in order to regularly maintain a readiness to promptly open fire with the greatest possible power on assault formations of the enemy.

2. It is necessary to deploy forces efficiently, create a strong position from which to fight the enemy and firmly protect each important strategic target.

In contrast to our people's war against the wars of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists, the targets which the air defense forces must protect in a war to protect the fatherland are very large and extend throughout the entire country. The number of strategic targets that must be firmly protected has increased many times. In addition, the enemy lives near us. This demands that the deployment of forces to fight the enemy be very scientific. On the basis of what we think the enemy might do, we must determinedly deploy concerted forces in the key directions; at the same time, we cannot allow weaknesses to develop in the other directions and mobile forces must be deployed to suitable positions, thereby creating an increasingly complete air defense battle position within each locality and throughout the country, creating a strong position from which to fight the enemy and firmly protect each important strategic target. This battle position must insure the concentration of all available air defense fire power in order to take the initiative and promptly engage the enemy in the primary directions and wherever they appear, deal the enemy a decisive blow, rapidly thwart their attack and firmly protect targets. Stationary forces and mobile forces must closely cooperate with one another in order to create a strong but flexible fire power network, create a position from which we can overwhelm and attack the attacking forces of the enemy and rapidly annihilate the attacking forces as they approach the target and in the area of their target.

The deployment of forces to protect each target consists of many lines and many levels of altitude; it is a deployment that has depth and interconnected battle positions in order to fight the enemy from the time they are far away until they are near, a deployment capable of reacting very rapidly and concentrating its fire power on the primary attacking formation of the enemy. This deployment must reflect offensive thinking and must have the ability to take the initiative in fighting the enemy in order to put the enemy on the defensive and make it difficult for them to deal with our effective, widespread anti-aircraft network in the area of each target.

Within this deployment, the strength of the air defense forces of the various services, military regions, military corps and all three military elements is pre-deployed and assigned specific missions. The air defense service consists of both mobile forces and stationary forces and is primarily responsible for

protecting important strategic targets by making fully effective use of each type of force and modern weapon. Air defense missiles have the task of destroying the offensive weapons of great destructive power and the airborne landing equipment of the enemy in their strategic air raid and airborne landing. The various types of anti-aircraft artillery are the primary form of fire power used to destroy the attacking aircraft and airborne assault aircraft of the enemy at low altitudes and crippled enemy aircraft. The other air defense forces fight the enemy wherever they appear. The radar troops have the mission of tightly controlling the air space over targets that must be protected, promptly reporting on the enemy situation in the air and fulfilling the tasks required by their function. The strength of the air defense service must be closely coordinated with the strength of the air force and the various forces, localities and branches in order to create a dense, strong air defense network in each area of air space over targets that must be protected.

To strengthen the reliability and flexibility of the battle position for combat operations against enemy air attacks and firmly protect each target, it is necessary to organize strong mobile forces and strong reserve forces. Mobile forces must be used to increase the strength of the stationary forces in the primary direction and at important moments in time in order to assemble the forces needed to win victory over the primary assault formation of the enemy. In this way, we can achieve the element of surprise, attack the enemy with higher effectiveness and defeat their scheme to attack us at a place where we are weak or have few forces. It is also possible to have forces that specialize in mobile missions, forces that have been organized and trained to meet the requirements of their task and occupy appropriate positions, forces that can rapidly strengthen the forces at key sites; in addition, other forces can be used to achieve mobility. However, both mobile forces and reserve forces must be deployed within a complete deployment and must always be in a high state of combat readiness and able to promptly go into combat in any direction.

Another point to which attention must be given is the need in modern warfare to maintain the secrecy of our deployment and forces both in the air and on the ground. Positive steps must be taken to develop camouflage and decoy measures in order to maintain our secrecy, thereby insuring that we can take the enemy by surprise and launch a strong attack against them as soon as they appear.

3. We must creatively and flexibly utilize the various methods of fighting that yield high combat efficiency.

The enemy might launch a massive, surprise, strategic air assault against important targets of ours and land troops by air in our rear area before, during or after they launch a large-scale war of aggression against our people. They might also conduct independent raids on targets deep within the territory of our country in order to cause us to suffer losses of manpower and materiel and undermine the socialist construction of our people. The methods of fighting



employed in combat operations against enemy air raids and airborne landings must be designed to win victory over the enemy in both of these situations. We must concentrate our efforts on successfully developing the most effective methods of attack possible, methods that enable us to destroy many enemy aircraft and smash each strategic air assault and airborne landing of the enemy.

The very basic requirement of the methods of fighting employed in combat operations against a strategic assault by the Chinese army is to seize the initiative and promptly begin fighting the enemy in every situation, fighting them with our entire strength, fighting the right objective, forcing them into a defensive position and causing them to meet tragic defeat at the very outset.

We must correctly and creatively employ both methods of fighting: fighting by means of stationary forces and fighting by means of mobile forces. These two methods can be applied in tactical operations as well as campaign size operations. The utilization of stationary forces to fight the enemy must meet the requirement of seizing the initiative and fighting the enemy by means of the greatest possible strength that can be employed in the primary direction of the enemy's assault, rapidly and systematically destroying large numbers of enemy aircraft, smashing the assault and airborne landing formations and forces of the enemy while they are still in the air and firmly protecting targets. The utilization of mobile forces must meet the requirements of achieving the element of surprise, achieving greater efficiency in fighting the enemy and firmly protecting important targets. When operations are on the scale of a campaign, both methods of fighting must be closely coordinated in order to fight the enemy under a single strategy, in accordance with the common combat operations plan, and competently support each other in order to thoroughly and comprehensively achieve the objectives necessitated by a campaign against the enemy air assault.

It is also necessary to make effective use of coordination between missile and anti-aircraft forces, coordination with the air force and the other forces. Coordinated combat operations will develop in size and component forces when the modern weapons and equipment of the air defense troops, in particular, and our armed forces, in general, are improved and increased in number. The coordination of many forces is needed to establish a multi-layer, multi-direction air defense network coordinated with other forces to establish a truly strong fire power belt capable of rapidly and systematically annihilating attacking enemy forces, thereby firmly protecting each assigned target. The highest requirement of combat coordination within the air defense service is to fully utilize the fighting strength of each force, closely coordinate these forces and create the greatest possible fighting strength in order to annihilate the air assault and airborne forces of the enemy before they reach their objective. When air defense forces have developed and are deployed everywhere, coordination among them becomes very complex and requires tight organization, specific instructions, strict regulations, full compliance with these regulations and the full display of unity and initiative in order to win a tremendous victory with high efficiency.

The creative utilization of methods of fighting is also expressed in the coordination of many forms of tactics and combat techniques in order to fight the enemy with the highest possible efficiency. This is based on the need to defeat each assault maneuver of the enemy and firmly protect targets. It is necessary to successfully coordinate many forms of tactics and combat techniques in order to continuously be on the offensive against the enemy and launch surprise attacks against the enemy with high combat efficiency. We must coordinate fighting the enemy on their approach to targets and fighting the enemy when they are attacking target areas. We must coordinate fighting airborne landings when these forces are still in the air and when they are on the ground. We must coordinate fighting the enemy from permanent battle positions with fighting the enemy from temporary battle positions. We must coordinate fighting the enemy by means of fire power and by means of electronic equipment. We must closely coordinate with the other branches and services in order to fight the enemy both in the air and on the ground. We must coordinate fighting the enemy with the use of camouflage, decoys and concealment to deceive the enemy.

A method of fighting can only be effective when everyone is fully proficient in his weapon or piece of equipment, especially modern weapons. Therefore, air defense cadres and soldiers must make every effort to learn and utilize, with the highest possible efficiency, their weapons and equipment in order to insure that their method of fighting is effective. The specific method of fighting employed also depends upon the qualifications and skills of the commander. Greater combat efficiency is achieved as the method of fighting is applied in a more flexible and creative manner. This was proven by the realities of the victories won in combat against the U.S. Air Force.

Another point to which attention must be given is that the methods of fighting employed in combat against an enemy air assault are constantly developing and changing in keeping with the changes in forces, equipment and weapons and in order to meet the requirements of missions and defeat the enemy, whose forces, technical equipment and methods of assault are also constantly changing.

4. It is necessary to raise the level of command organization to suit combat operations against enemy air assaults and to protect the fatherland.

This is a pressing immediate and long-range requirement. A rather large number of air defense cadres gained experience in commanding air defense combat operations in the fight against the United States for national salvation; however, they do not have experience in combat operations against enemy air assaults in a war to protect the fatherland under the modern conditions that now exist. Clearly, the corps of command cadres and the cadres within the command staffs of the air defense service face new developments, new requirements of a war to protect the fatherland. We must fight victoriously against our new combat objective in the air, the Chinese air force; we must firmly protect important targets throughout the country, we must fully employ

the strength of the air defense forces and their modern weapons and equipment; we must establish coordination on a large scale with the other branches and services in order to firmly protect many strategic targets during the same period of time. Winning victory over strategic air assaults and airborne landings by the enemy while defeating every other act of aggression by the enemy's air force are a new and very high requirement of the air defense troops, primarily the corps of cadres of the service.

We must raise the level of command organization of the corps of air defense cadres in a very urgent manner in order to meet these requirements.

To begin with, the command organization on each level must insure that the unit can take the initiative and inflict losses upon the enemy before they launch their assault, insure that the enemy is attacked utilizing the greatest possible strength of all of the forces of the unit in every direction. We absolutely must not be taken by surprise. These are the basic command requirements of combat air defense forces today.

Of utmost importance is the need to focus our efforts on scrutinizing and observing the enemy in the air and predicting with increasing accuracy and fullness the plan, forces and tactics to be employed by the enemy in an assault, especially in the air space over targets that we predict might be attacked in an enemy strategic air raid and airborne landing. On this basis, we must establish the best possible combat plan, one taking many different directions from which the enemy might attack into consideration, and constantly amend and improve this plan.

Every effort must be made to raise the level of organization and command in large-scale battles and campaigns in which we are continuously fighting enemy air assaults in many different directions at the same time. This involves commanding coordinated combat operations involving many modern technical branches. We must effectively command all battles and campaigns against enemy air assaults occurring over a vast area of the skies. We must utilize, as effectively as possible, the power of modern weapons and equipment in a manner consistent with our methods of fighting, thereby rapidly frustrating the tactics and measures employed by the enemy in their air assault. Complex combat and campaign situations must be dealt with in a precise, rapid and flexible manner in order to win victory in these situations. We must truly help the lower levels organize their combat operations and employ the various forms and tactics of combat against enemy assaults. We must raise the level of organization and management and improve the guidance of the buildup and training of units in accordance with the requirements of modern air defense warfare.

Modern air defense combat operations against strategic air assaults are generally very large in scale, occur rapidly, involve very heavy fighting and result in the consumption of a very large quantity of materials and technical equipment. To win victory, to win victory continuously, it is

absolutely necessary to provide a full, accurate, well coordinated and timely supply of materials and technical equipment, especially technical equipment. The command organization must attach fully importance to this support plan and establish a very good organization so that a large volume of supplies can be promptly sent to battle positions in every situation in order to maintain continuous combat operations.

Modern air defense combat operations against strategic air assaults and airborne landings demand that we rapidly upgrade to a regular-force level command operations and the workstyle of command staffs and take positive steps to improve the quality of this work. The commander and his staff must be trained in order to raise their overall qualifications in terms of basic theory, their grasp of the political and military lines, their grasp of military art, their grasp of air defense combat operations and their air defense command skills. Particular attention must be given to their ability to command large-scale, coordinated combat operations and utilize increasingly improved command means in order to rapidly smash large-scale assault formations of the enemy. We must simultaneously improve the qualifications of commanders and command staffs and achieve smooth coordination between command cadres and command staffs in the art of commanding combat operations against strategic enemy air assaults.

Joining the other services and branches in combat operations to defeat strategic air assaults and airborne landings is one of the very weighty and glorious tasks of the air defense forces of our fatherland. To complete this task, the air defense forces are increasing their fighting strength to meet the requirements of their task. Each person, each unit and each branch of the air defense service must make every effort to forge themselves in every respect so that they are able to take prompt and precise action in the maintenance of combat readiness and in combat at any time in order to strongly attack the enemy, rapidly smash their air assaults and airborne landings and firmly protect the sacred air space and territory of the fatherland.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### **GUIDELINES PRESENTED FOR IMPROVING REAR SERVICE MANAGEMENT**

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 9, Sep 79 pp 31-38

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Xuan Luong: "Rear Service Management in Combat"]

[Text] In combat, rear service work and the rear service sector have the mission of fully and promptly meeting each need of the people's armed forces on all fronts and levels; effective support must be provided in every situation, even in the most urgent, complex and difficult situations. To complete this mission well, the rear service organizations on the various levels, from the strategic level to the basic rear service units, must fully and thoroughly perform their support function, their production function and their management function.

Rear service management is a very important function, one closely linked to the support and production functions of the rear service sector. Only with good management is it possible to improve the productivity and quality of rear service production and support.

Over the past several years, we have conducted many programs to improve rear service management but have not met requirements. The changes that have occurred in outlook, thinking, organization, methods and style of work in rear service management have not been strong. Generally speaking, we have not firmly assessed the needs of the entire army or each unit nor have we fully assessed our supply capabilities. There is not strict compliance with regulations and standards. The utilization of manpower and materiel is still marked by inefficiency, waste and losses.

These shortcomings and weaknesses in rear service management have adversely affected the sector's support and production work and caused the life of troops at some places to be unstable, to involve unnecessary deprivations. If we quickly correct these shortcomings in management, we will, even though our supply capabilities are limited and unable to play their full role, have a good effect upon the fighting strength of our armed forces. Therefore, one



pressing requirement we face at this time is for the rear service organizations on the various levels to revamp and strengthen their management in order to bring about new changes in rear service support of combat and combat readiness so that the people's armed forces always have the material conditions needed to win victory over the enemy in every situation.

1. Fully assessing every change in the situation within the unit while correctly predicting needs and adopting an accurate rear service support plan.

The rear service sector has the task of supporting the armed forces in their construction and combat operations. In construction as well as combat, the situation of units is constantly changing, especially in combat, where the situation sometimes becomes very urgent and complex. The needs of each unit depend upon its task and the specific period of time; needs vary from time to time and place to place. If we do not firmly assess the situation, it is impossible to adopt a rear service support plan that is consistent with the requirements of units. The experience gained in the resistance against the French and the resistance against the United States as well as the recent fight against the Chinese expansionists shows that to provide good rear service management it is first of all necessary to firmly assess every change in the construction and combat of the units throughout the army.

The headquarters staff is the center collecting, researching and integrating information on every aspect of the situation in combat operations; at the same time, it helps the commanders on the various levels issue orders and combat plans for the purpose of achieving victory in combat. It is also the staff that keeps statistics on and keeps abreast of the situation surrounding troop strength, weapons and material-technical bases attached to the unit normally and assigned to the unit as reinforcements; it researches and proposes to the commander plans for supplementing the unit's troop strength and weaponry; and it strengthens the unit's organization and reorganizes its equipment in keeping with the requirements of combat missions. Therefore, the rear service staff must maintain close relations with the headquarters staff in order to fully assess every aspect of the situation surrounding troops. Taking positive steps to establish close relations with the headquarters staff in order to keep abreast of the situation and the combat plan will enable the rear service staff to avoid confusion. Of critical importance is the need to keep abreast of important changes that have an impact upon rear service activities, such as the following:

--The results of combat, the number of casualties and the quantity of materials expended or lost; enemy activities related to rear service work; the intended utilization of our manpower and fire power; the amount of ammunition consumed; the amount of ammunition being held in reserve to promptly reinforce units and so forth;

--The situation surrounding roads, bridges and ferry crossings and the degree to which communications-information and liaison operations can be maintained, especially in units engaged in heavy combat or units moving quickly from one place to another;

--The situation surrounding troop mobility, the consumption of gasoline and oil, the technical condition of vehicles and machinery, increases or decreases in troop strength and equipment, the various aspects of work involved in troop reinforcements and so forth.

In actuality, basic rear service support plans, regardless of how accurate they might be, always need to be revised and supplemented and are often revised or supplemented when preparations are being made for combat. Therefore, only by promptly and fully assessing the situation is it possible to revise this plan. When a new situation develops, it is necessary to research, analyze and compare it to the basic plan in order to make timely revisions.

A change in the situation, although it might not immediately affect the rear service support plan, will affect the rear service support organization at some point in time. Rear service management must plan ahead in order to avoid taking action after it is too late. It is necessary to conduct research, plan ahead at an early date, observe the changes in the new situation and adopt measures for correctly responding to this new situation.

Every aspect of the situation must be assessed in order to make correct predictions. Predicting changes in the situation is a very important factor in adopting an accurate support plan, taking the initiative, being the masters on the battlefield and meeting each need of units, thereby insuring that troops are always in a state of combat readiness and have the ability to fight for many days and win victory in every situation, at every time and place.

In order to make correct predictions, it is necessary to fully assess the combat objective, necessary to be fully familiar with the combat mission and overall strategy and necessary to know the battlefield. We must research and correctly evaluate the enemy and correctly predict the primary direction from which they will attack as well as their strategy and tactics, especially such tactics as making deep penetrations and isolating our units as well as their ability to attack our rear area in order to take suitable measures to deal with them. We must have a firm grasp of what we intend to do in combat, the needs of the various combat units, material and technical capabilities, support forces, support sources, roads and means of transportation that can be mobilized and must have a clear knowledge of the terrain, weather, climate, population, political conditions and economic situation of the battlefield in order to lay the foundation for planning the establishment of a high quality support organization in the correct direction. Many different plans must be adopted to deal with the various complex and rapid developments in combat; however, efforts must be focused on the formulation of the basic plan

in order to prepare rear service support at key, centralized sites, thereby reducing decentralization and stagnation, which lead to the waste of manpower and materiel and sometimes destroy the work that has been performed.

Good rear service management involves formulating a correct rear service support plan for combat. The basic rear service support plan of each level is the foundation for achieving unity of action from the top to the bottom, is the foundation for initiating the specific jobs involved in the support provided by the rear service sector. This is the most important element of rear service management. Some units become confused and unable to do anything during the initial stage of a war because they failed to formulate a basic rear service support plan ahead of time.

The rear service commander must begin drafting a rear service support plan as soon as he has been assigned his mission, has reached agreement with the headquarters staff and has the approval of the unit's commander. This plan consists of the following principal points:

- Calculating and determining the material and troop support needs of the entire unit, of each branch and service in accordance with the requirements of the combat mission;

- Estimating the level of casualties, the level of consumption and need to supply weapons, ammunition and petroleum products and estimating the need to repair technical equipment;

- Organizing transportation, establishing transportation routes, assigning troops to participate in transport operations and the construction of transport roads and establishing the order of priority for the supply of petroleum products for combat equipment;

- Establishing the order in which military medical detachments will be employed and organizing the evacuation of the wounded;

- Determining the deployment of rear service and technical units within the overall formation of the entire unit, determining the position, time of deployment and direction of movement of the rear service command and organizing information and liaison operations;

- Organizing the protection, defense and guarding of the rear service zone.

To insure that a high quality plan is adopted, it is necessary to fully prepare the various factors involved in the formulation of the plan; correctly evaluate the situation; estimate support sources with relative accuracy; know the combat mission thoroughly and predict the basic directions in which combat will take place; correctly determine the center, the focal point of support work and the key jobs involved; and balance needs with capabilities.



The realities of the two wars to protect the fatherland on the southwestern border and the northern border showed: attention must be given to establishing support levels and lines, stipulating the responsibility of each level in a clear manner and determining the amount of material reserves of each level, overall consumption and losses and the consumption and losses during each battle and phase of combat.

It is necessary to establish the responsibility of each level; with each descending level, it is necessary to be more specific and detailed and necessary to set forth practical, effective measures consistent with each level. The predicted level of consumption and need to resupply weapons, ammunition and petroleum products in combat must be consistent with actual consumption, with our resupply, maintenance and protection capabilities and with the viewpoint of practicing frugality in construction and combat. In particular, positive steps must be taken to maintain and improve the health of troops and to manage, maintain, reclaim and repair rear service equipment and supplies.

2. It is necessary to efficiently organize the rear service system and skillfully guide, observe and closely inspect every aspect of rear service work.

A basic requirement of rear service management in combat and combat readiness is the need for an efficient organization. The rear service organization in a war to protect the fatherland must fully reflect the viewpoint of the people's war and the defense of the nation by all the people. We must build a good rear service organization for main force units, a good local rear service organization and a truly strong people's rear service organization. All three types of rear service organizations must be closely coordinated within one integrated system within each locality, each zone and throughout the country, thereby forming a strong and stable rear service battle position.

To insure the annihilation of the enemy, effectively protect the life and property of the people and implement the slogan "we shall not move 1 inch," the rear service organizations of the army and the localities in the border and coastal regions must be strong enough to support local armed forces in combat for a given period of time. At the same time, the rear service organizations in the rear must be strong so that they are ready to reinforce the frontlines and enable them to fight on a continuous basis.

The rear service organizations of the various military regions, provinces and districts in the border areas and everywhere else must be well coordinated, well balanced and staffed and equipped in a manner corresponding to their task. The people's rear service organizations at places that "take the brunt of the waves and wind" must be strengthened and their organization, task, duties, mode of support and work procedures must be governed by regulations.

Only by deploying rear services well is it possible to achieve the strength of the rear service organization and provide full and timely support of combat.

operations. The rear service deployment of units must be based on the resolution of the party committee, on the determination and combat plan of the unit commander, on the rear service order of the upper level, on the situation surrounding local rear service organizations and forces, on the terrain, weather, roads, rivers and streams, on the enemy situation and the nature of the work involved.

The rear service deployment based on the overall defense plan must be marked by both breadth and mobility and result in a closely knitted deployment in the various directions, on the various campaign, tactical and combat lines and among units. The rear service operations of the various levels, from the company and battalion to the military region and military corps, must give full attention to organizing the protection, defense and guarding of the rear service zone in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating to and attacking our rear service warehouses and stations.

Rear service operations in very urgent and continuous combat coordinated among the various branches and services involves many unexpected and complicated situations. Without providing good guidance it is impossible to manage the various rear service operations and forces.

Good guidance always involves being fully aware of what the unit commander intends to do in combat, keeping abreast of needs and capabilities and making comprehensive and timely preparations in the proper place. Skilled guidance is also expressed in knowing how to mobilize, organize and utilize forces and direct every job in a positive, effective, creative, flexible and scientific manner; it involves focusing on important matters while maintaining a comprehensive point of view; it also involves routinely maintaining strong reserve forces and being ready to reinforce the various fronts and zones in difficult, unexpected situations. Only with good guidance is it possible to limit material and technical damages and losses; possible to provide technical support and make full use of the power of weapons and technical equipment in combat; possible to rapidly restore the health of troops after each phase or stage of combat; possible to promptly reinforce and resupply units and successfully protect rear service zones, thereby providing troops with regular, continuous support so that they can annihilate the enemy. In summary, good guidance involves maintaining and enhancing the support capabilities of the rear service organization and increasing the fighting strength of the unit.

Good guidance is the result of steadfastly improving oneself, studying and forging oneself in peace time in accordance with the requirements of war time and in the process of the rear service command cadres' work of providing combat support. It is also the result of establishing a uniform, scientific and regular-force work method from top to bottom, throughout the entire rear service sector and throughout the army. If the reporting procedures on the various levels are not fully complied with, if the

procedures for formulating rear service support plans are not respected, if persons do whatever they want to do, if they merely allocate whatever they need and use whatever they have, it is impossible to provide guidance, impossible to raise the productivity, quality and efficiency of rear service support work.

To guide rear service work in combat well, it is also necessary to have a separate liaison-information network for the rear service organizations on the various lines, primarily within the military regions and military corps tasked with maintaining combat readiness on crucial battlefields and in key strategic directions. Only in this way can the rear service commander fully and promptly assess the situation and guide the various aspects of rear service work in a steady manner that yields high productivity and is marked by high quality.

In the process of implementing the rear service support plan, it is necessary to routinely conduct inspections in order to determine existing problems and promptly take corrective measures in order to successfully carry out the task of providing combat units with rear service support and, at the same time, help the lower level and the rear service staff subordinate to the organization prepare and provide combat support.

Importance must be attached to conducting inspections to insure the thorough performance of combat missions and the implementation of the principal measures of decisive significance in providing rear service combat support, especially in opening battles, key battles and primary combat zones.

Conducting inspections is the responsibility of the commander and the rear service staff on the various levels. The commander can conduct scheduled or unscheduled inspections or give the rear service and headquarters staff the authority to conduct inspections and deliver reports.

The subjects of inspections must be based on the requirements of tasks and the actual situation. As regards subordinate units, the inspection conducted by the rear service commander and the rear service staff must focus on the following specific points:

--How well the task of the unit is understood as expressed in the rear service support determination and plan and the organization of implementation by the subordinate commander;

--The situation surrounding the maintenance of rear service combat readiness, with importance attached to units on combat alert duty and units stationed face to face with the enemy;

-- the various measures for protecting the rear area, protecting rear service warehouses and depots;

-- compliance with rear service policies and regulations;

-- the various areas of organization, equipment, material support, support of everyday life, health care, military medical support, transport support, local rear service support capabilities and the management of rear service material and technical bases on subordinate levels.

3. It is necessary to heighten the effectiveness of the management agencies and, at the same time, fully implement the right of collective ownership of the masses throughout the process of providing rear service management.

Rear service management is comprehensive management involving the management of organization and work, the management of labor, finances, supplies and technology and management before, during and after the process of providing rear service support in exact accordance with the line and position of the party and the principles, regulations and policies of the state and army. In combat and combat readiness, rear service management activities on the battlefield also serve the function of properly organizing communications and transportation, which are the central elements of rear service combat support, observing and guiding the support of the everyday life and the health of the unit, receiving, treating and transporting wounded soldiers, etc.

To manage these jobs well, it is absolutely necessary to develop the highest possible efficiency on the part of rear service agencies and units. To accomplish this, in conjunction with building and improving work methods and the style of work, we must urgently build and strengthen the specialized apparatus so that it is strong enough to manage and guide rear service work. We must uphold the right of collective ownership of the cadres and soldiers in rear service support work and avoid the maladies of bureaucracy and authoritarianism, which pose a bother to everyone. Key importance must be attached to building and strengthening the headquarters (planning) and rear service staffs on the various levels and within the various sectors as well as the corps of rear service management cadres in units working on the defense lines. A unified, scientific and practical plan must be adopted which insures that every organization and level is strengthened in terms of both its size and quality. Staffs must be truly streamlined and strong so that they are fully capable of performing their functions and can achieve the highest possible effectiveness in their comprehensive guidance, command work and management. Cadres must receive thorough, regular training in their profession, in ethical qualities, style, and military and political requirements so that they can fulfill the duties assigned to them.

The cadres in rear service staffs and units, especially the corps of cadres engaged in management and headquarters (planning) work, must be stabilized in terms of their organization, must be skilled in their profession and must be governed by a clear division of labor based on high specialization and the performance of duties by a common method. These are very important requirements that have a profound and direct effect upon the effort to heighten the effectiveness of the rear service staff in combat and combat readiness, requirements that must be met by the various levels better.

The division of labor based on high specialization must be implemented beginning when preparations are being made. Only in this way can cadres grasp the matters and plans of which they have been put in charge and handle complex situations in an effective, flexible, rapid and correct manner. When new cadres are assigned to the unit, veteran cadres must continue to be given specialized jobs assigned by the upper level and must be the nucleus of the cadre force.

When the rear service organization is strengthened and increased by many new components, those components that have achieved a high level of specialization in their work, know the battlefield and have established relatively good work procedures should be used as the nucleus and an exchange of experiences in work methods should be conducted in order to rapidly create uniformity and unity within the rear service staff and units.

The work requirements and work methods of the commander and staff, of the staff on the upper level and the staff on the lower level must be governed by uniform regulations; training must be provided in these requirements and methods and combined training conducted in peace time will help to establish uniformity of actions in combat and help the apparatus to achieve the full strength of the collective and competently support troops in combat so that victory is won.

Rear service management involves many complex problems closely related to the life and interests of soldiers. Therefore, fully implementing the right of collective ownership in rear service activities and having the masses participate in management are very necessary. This is a very important and pressing matter especially with regard to units working on defense lines, places that now face very high requirements.

In rear service work, upholding the spirit of ownership means always being prepared in terms of thinking, organization, forces and material-technical bases in order to fulfill the task of supporting the armed forces so that they can hold their positions in combat with the enemy while still being able to conduct mobile operations to defeat waves of attack by the enemy, annihilate very many enemy forces while they are still in border and coastal areas, wherever the enemy appears, and maintain control in every situation.



This control is clearly evident in the results of troop support in combat. Whether they are in defensive, counter-offensive or offensive combat, regardless of where or when their activities are being conducted, troops must be fully and promptly supplied in accordance with uniform standards and supplied in the form of material goods; their eating, shelter and activities must be as normal as permitted by conditions; and it is necessary to maintain a sanitary lifestyle, maintain the deportment of masters, of victors and insure a high percentage of healthy troops. Cadres and soldiers who are wounded or become ill must be promptly rescued and provided with good treatment; this will result in a low percentage of disabilities and death and return many cadres and soldiers to their work or combat units. When necessary, units must have adequate means to resupply and move troops in accordance with their combat plan. On the other hand, everyone must display a high spirit of collective ownership, a high sense of frugality and self-reliance, a high sense of organization and discipline.

It is necessary, in every situation, to fully comply with the regulations on financial and property management; an effort must be made to maintain property and use it for a long time and every effort must be made to protect public property and utilize the full power of weapons and equipment in order to fight continuously, strongly and for a long period of time. At the same time, it is necessary to display a high spirit of ownership of supply sources, which include the sources of the state, the sources of the people, sources taken from the enemy, sources produced by troops themselves and aid from fraternal countries. Because, this is a factor in creating the material strength needed for rear service activities and the rear service organizations on the various levels to successfully complete their task of supporting the people's armed forces in victorious combat and in the maintenance of a high level of combat readiness in every situation.

7809

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### ARTICLE STRESSES IMPROVEMENT OF LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDS

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[Article by Nguyen Thai: "Improving the Ability of Local Military Command Cadres and Staffs To Organize and Command Combat Operations"]

[Text] The new development of the task and capabilities of the local people's war in a war to protect the fatherland raises new requirements concerning the qualifications and ability of the local military command cadres and staffs on the various levels to provide guidance and command troops, especially the requirement of improving their ability to organize and command combat and campaign operations. The realities of the recent combat operations of the localities on the southwestern border and the northern border show that there are many new matters that must be researched and resolved regarding organizing and commanding the combat operations of the local people's war.

This article presents a number of opinions by way of contributing to the discussion and research of the impact of the new developments in the local people's war upon the organizing and commanding of combat operations and the subjects in which training must be provided in order to improve the capabilities of local military command cadres and staffs.

1. The new developments of the local people's war and the requirements regarding the ability to command combat operations.

The local people's war in a war to protect the fatherland has undergone some new and very basic developments compared to the local people's war in a war of liberation. On the basis of the unprecedented strength of the socialist construction now being carried out and developed within each locality and throughout the entire country, the people's war within each village, district, province and municipality has developed very highly from the very outset and achieved a tremendous combined strength. The local people's war combined with combat operations by our mobile main force military

corps is strong enough to defeat an aggressor army and firmly protect the locality, protect the fatherland.

The local people's war has the task of mobilizing and organizing all the people in determined combat operations to smash attacks by the enemy against the locality or schemes and acts of insurrection by reactionaries in conjunction with firmly protecting the land, the government, the life and property of the people and the economic installations of the locality, thereby creating the conditions for and closely coordinating with combat operations by mobile main force military corps while helping to develop and offensive strategic position, annihilating large enemy forces and totally defeating their war of aggression.

The performance of the tasks mentioned above raises new requirements regarding the qualities and capabilities of the local military command cadres and staffs on the various levels. The realities of the recent fight have shown that local military cadres must first symbolize the will and determination to protect the locality, protect the fatherland; they must remain within the locality in every situation in order to command the army and people in victorious combat. They must have a full grasp of and effectively implement the military line and task as well as military science and art; they must have the ability to guide the movement of all the people fighting the enemy and must be able to organize and command battles and campaigns (primarily on the provincial and municipal levels), including defensive, counter-offensive and offensive operations by the local armed forces. They must have the ability to coordinate the performance of a combat mission with economic construction and development within each militia unit, self-defense unit, local army unit and so forth.

In contrast to a war of liberation, in a war to protect the fatherland the combat and combat support forces of the locality develop with unprecedented strength. The militia, self-defense and local army forces of the districts, provinces and municipalities are built up, developed and become strong before war breaks out. The troop strength of these forces is large, their scale of organization is large, their technical equipment is increasingly modern and they consist of many technical branches. Combat support forces are also organized and trained before war breaks out. In the recent fight, some districts had tens of thousands of persons bear arms in combat and combat support operations; some districts and provinces received forces from the rear for combat.

These developments raise the very pressing requirement that local military command cadres and staffs must have the ability to utilize the full fighting strength of the combat and combat support forces within the locality regardless of how difficult or complex circumstances might be. Specifically, local military command cadres and staffs, from the village to the district,

provincial and municipal levels, must have full knowledge of the task, combat capabilities, method of fighting and weapons of many types of combat forces so that they can employ the full strength of these forces to annihilate the enemy and firmly protect the locality. They must be able to organize and command the militia, self-defense and local army forces in defensive, counter-offensive and offensive operations against the enemy in small-scale as well as medium-scale and large-scale combat; they must not only fight to wear the enemy down, but must also systematically destroy whole enemy units and they must not only attack targets they themselves select, but must also fight in accordance with the common plan. They must have the ability to organize coordination among the various forces: among militia and self-defense units, between the militia and self-defense units and the local troops of the district and province and between the stationary armed forces and mobile, main force military corps in medium and large-scale operations.

In addition, they must have the ability to establish a centralized, unified command, must be able to organize and command troops in a very scientific manner, must be well versed in staff work, must possess a serious, precise style in commanding combat operations and must be able to plan for many complex situations that might occur, thereby insuring that the combat forces of the locality are smoothly coordinated in combat.

The local people's war in a war to protect the fatherland can occur throughout the territory of each locality under many different forms of warfare. At present, compared to the village, district, province and municipality of past years, due to the results of reorganizing the localities in keeping with the requirements of developing the economy and strengthening the national defense system, the area of combat operations of a village, district, province and municipality is very much larger and encompasses many economic, civilian and national defense targets as well as many different types of terrain. This situation demands that command cadres and command staffs be able to keep abreast of and directly control complex combat operations occurring throughout the territory of the locality, operations of forces being carried out in accordance with the established combat plan, especially when the combat situation become complex. The local military commander and command staff must be able to organize and command the combat operations of many forces in many different directions and zones. They must know and be able to creatively apply the various forms of offensive, defensive and counter-offensive warfare, decentralized and centralized methods of attack, combat operations within combat clusters and combat villages, combat operations within temporarily controlled enemy areas, attacks deep behind the enemy, etc. They must truly make comprehensive, detailed and specific preparations in every area for continuous, lengthy combat by the local army and people. Particular attention must be given to the organization and measures needed to firmly maintain an unbroken and strong change of command in large areas of operation in complex combat situations.



The people's war in a war to protect the fatherland must contend with large-scale enemy attacks against the territory of our country combined with internal insurrection fomented by reactionaries. They have many very crafty and cruel schemes and tricks, from military attacks and economic destruction to psychological warfare and so forth. The requirement of a war to protect the fatherland is that each locality must hold its ground in order to fight the enemy and protect itself. The combat situation might be made more complex by the enemy's large number of troops or by the fact that they pick the time and target for aggressive attacks. Therefore, the local military command cadre and staff must look for every way to evaluate and correctly analyze the intentions and actions of the enemy and must prepare the local army and people to seize the initiative and attack the enemy in any situation and in accordance with the established plan. They must truly prepare for and firmly command the fight against the enemy as soon as they touch local soil, must wear down and annihilate many enemy troops, must impede their progress and create the conditions for large-scale counter-offensive and offensive blows by the mobile main force military corps. At the same time, they must be ready to command the army and the people in the rear in immediately thwarting every scheme and act of insurrection by internal reactionaries. When the enemy launches attacks deep within our hinterland, they must determinedly and flexibly command the army and people in victorious combat when encircled by the enemy, when their area is temporarily occupied by the enemy, etc.

2. The guidelines and requirements in training local military command cadres and staffs in organizing and commanding combat operations.

To begin with, it is necessary to improve their ability to serve as the staff of the party committee in determining combat objectives, the combat plan and the area of combat operations.

The local people's war is a war waged by all the people, a comprehensive war directly led by the party committee within the locality. The local military command cadres and command staffs on the various levels have the responsibility of serving as the staff of the party committee echelon in mobilizing, organizing and leading all the people in combat.

Of utmost importance in their task of serving as the staff of the party committee echelon is for local military command cadres and staffs to research and propose to the party committee combat objectives and the best possible combat plan for protecting the locality.

To be able to research and propose a correct combat objective and plan to the party committee, local military command cadres and staffs must have a full understanding of the upper level's intention, our thinking guiding combat operations in a war to protect the fatherland, the tasks of the local people's war and the new capabilities of the locality. On this basis,



they must deeply research the political and military tasks assigned to the locality by the upper level, the overall situation of the locality and the relationship between their locality and other localities and set forth a correct and specific objective, a specific combat task for the locality and a combat plan to meet the pressing demands of the locality.

In the proposal concerning the combat objective and the plan for protecting the locality, the local military command cadres and staffs must help the party committee reach relatively accurate conclusions concerning the intentions, actions and forces of the enemy in the locality; must establish the defense lines of the various villages, districts, provinces and municipalities; determine the primary defensive front and the places where counter-attacks and attacks by large-scale forces of the locality will be launched; determine the key defense zones; determine a plan for the utilization of forces; determine a plan for coordination with forces of the upper level; determine where the major battles will occur in the important directions and the scale of campaigns within the province and municipality, including defensive, counter-offensive and offensive campaigns; organize technical rear service support; organize the temporary relocation of the material wealth of the people and the state; determine matters upon which guidance must be focused; determine modes for firmly maintaining guidance and command procedures throughout the course of combat, etc.

The ability to help the party committee in this regard is manifested in fully, accurately and specifically analyzing on a scientific basis the various proposals that are made; correctly establishing the major measures for implementing the combat plan approved by the party committee; organizing the implementation of the determination and plan to protect the locality among the armed forces and the people. To develop this ability, local military command cadres and staffs must truly study and train themselves, must have a firm grasp of the various matters related to the line and viewpoint of the party in the conduct of a local people's war, a war to protect the fatherland and must have the ability to integrate information on every aspect of the military, political and economic situations within the locality.

Secondly, it is necessary to improve the ability of command cadres and staffs to organize and command the correct and creative implementation of the combat determination and combat plan established by the party committee echelon.

The local military command cadres and staffs are the persons who are primarily responsible for organizing and commanding the implementation of the combat determination and plan within the locality. To fulfill this responsibility, local military command cadres and staffs must have the ability to organize and fully implement the combat task of units and must inspect this implementation by evaluating the situation surrounding combat preparations,

the organization of forces, training, rear service preparations and so forth. In the process of conducting this inspection and providing supervision, it is necessary to promptly detect mistakes in order to rectify them on the spot or propose to the party committee ways to reorganize forces, readjust various areas of work and readjust the norms set forth in the combat plan.

When war breaks out, local military command cadres and staffs must concentrate on commanding the forces of both the army and the people in successfully implementing the decision of the party committee. They must focus on commanding the forces in important direction and in important battles. They must utilize the collective strength of the various military commands in order to deal with complex combat situations in a correct and flexible manner. They must always maintain close coordination among the various villages, clusters, districts and forces. In this regard, importance must be attached to the ability to apply tactics and guide the implementation of the primary tactics employed within the province and municipality; the ability to grasp campaign art and guide campaigns; and the ability to promptly manage, deploy and utilize forces in the course of combat, in the course of a campaign. One very high and very new requirement is that local military command cadres and staffs on the district, provincial and municipal levels must organize and carry out large-scale battles in which there is coordination among the various forces and small-scale and medium-scale campaigns by the forces of the locality in order to deliver increasingly large blows to the enemy.

Due to the development of the combat forces and area of combat operations of the local people's war, local military command cadres and staffs must have the ability to organize technical rear service support in order to meet the many needs for grain, the rescue of wounded soldiers and repair a number of weapons and pieces of combat equipment. This organizational work must insure the constant heightening of the fighting strength and enable continuous combat operations on the part of the various forces and units of the locality in the combat villages and combat clusters and meet the requirements of concerted warfare, of combat coordination among the various branches, of the need to fight steadfastly for many days and so forth.

In the process of guiding and commanding combat operations, it is necessary to correct any manifestations of operating in a simplistic, haphazard manner or the "guerrilla" style. It must be clearly realized that once concerted combat operations reach the scale of companies, battalions and regiments, once we begin using technical units, such as ground artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, engineers and so forth, the organizational and command activities of local military command cadres and staffs must be carried out under the requirements of centralization, precision and unity, carried out under a plan, carried out on a stable basis in order to have an effective command.

Thirdly, it is necessary to improve their ability to strengthen and develop forces in the course of combat.

The combat operations of the local army and people, most importantly the localities on the frontline, are usually marked by continuous, heavy fighting for many days. To develop this fight with increasingly large victories and firmly protect the locality, the various localities must be skilled in strengthening their forces in combat. This work is performed by the entire party, all the people, the agencies of the state and the local mass organizations. However, it is the local military command cadre and staff that bear the major responsibility in reorganizing forces in order to make complete staffs, strengthen the organization of units and train reinforcements, redistributing equipment, directly implementing directives of the party committee and people's committee concerning the organization of new forces in the locality and receiving and employing forces sent from the rear. To fulfill these tasks, they must be able to assess changes in forces, propose plans for revamping the organization and rearranging forces and know how to supervise the implementation of decisions on strengthening combat forces. In particular, it must be clearly recognized that present combat requirements demand that this work be performed in an urgent, timely fashion in the course of combat. In the recent fight, many districts and provinces had to reorganize their forces and organize whole companies and battalions of local troops in the process of heavy combat.

3. It is necessary to strengthen the local military command to suit the requirements of the combat task.

In order to command combat operations in a truly effective manner, it is necessary to have a strong local military command. Strengthening and raising the local military command to a new level of development so that it is fully capable of organizing and commanding combat operations and campaigns within the scope of each locality and in coordination with the forces of the upper level have been and are one of several pressing requirements.

This work involves an entire process; however, we must urgently begin to perform it in order to rapidly meet the need to strengthen the local military command in a comprehensive and solid manner.

The local military commands on the various levels must be strengthened so that they truly become a strong organization suited to the task they must perform. The scale of organization, the number and quality of cadres and personnel, the organizational staff and the work means of the local military commands on the various levels must be correctly and efficiently determined on the basis of their tasks, their volume of work and the working conditions and combat conditions of each locality. When examining this matter, it is necessary to research and investigate the command organization of the units of the standing army. However, this organization should not be used as the standard for organizing the local military command.

At present, the local military commands from the village, especially from the district, to the provincial and municipal levels consist of staff, political and rear service components and a number of subordinate specialized units. The realities of combat have shown that such a command structure is necessary. At the same time, they have also clearly shown that we must conduct research in order to determine the suitable number of persons required. This includes determining the appropriate number of persons needed for each type locality, that is, localities in the mountains, the midlands and the lowlands, localities on the front and in the rear. Determining the number of persons on the military command on each level must be done at an early date and in a unified manner so that the organization is stable.

The common principle to be applied in organizing the military command of the locality or of mobile main force troops is that the command must be streamlined and effective. For this reason, it is necessary to carefully calculate each job in order to determine the exact number of persons needed, in order not to have one unnecessary person.

It is necessary to correctly understand the new requirements of local military commands.

In the past, the local military command served the function of primarily helping to provide guidance in the local people's war. Today, this command still has the responsibility of guiding the movement on the basis level. However, due to the development of the situation, the local military command must also directly command combat operations and campaigns within the locality. Moreover, due to the nature and characteristics of concerted warfare, of coordination among the various branches of the local people's war in the new stage, the local military command is also a command that commands concerted warfare operations and coordination among the various branches.

The strengthening of local military commands absolutely must be consistent with this new requirement. In order to meet this requirement, it is necessary to resolve many problems in a well coordinated manner: improving the qualifications of local military commands to meet new requirements; assigning more cadres to the command who are skilled in organizing and commanding concerted warfare operations and coordination among the various branches; improving the regular-force qualifications of the command in its organization and operation; improving the style of the command, providing it with more equipment for command and signal activities, etc.

When resolving these problems, it is necessary to avoid the tendency to only attach importance to increasing the number of or replacing cadres on the command staff. The actual situation has shown that it is still of primary importance to train the existing corps of cadres of the command while strengthening the organization of the local military command in every respect. Recent combat experience has shown that many of the shortcomings in



the organizing and commanding of concerted warfare operations and coordination among the various branches are not due to a lack of trained and experienced cadres. They are primarily due to the failure to upgrade the organization of the command to the level of a command in charge of concerted warfare operations and the coordination of the forces of many branches.

The local military command must be organized in a scientific and regular-force manner consistent with the nature and characteristics of a command that guides and commands the local people's war.

Being scientific and regular-force is one of the basic requirements of the military command. These characteristics are manifested in clearly and specifically defining the duties, tasks, principles, work procedures and division of labor of the cadres, personnel and components within the command. At present, our local military commands from the village, especially the district, levels upward consist of many components and many cadres, personnel and subordinate units. In order for this apparatus to work well, in order for these personnel and components to be closely linked together and not duplicate one another's work, it is necessary to clearly define the task of each component and person, to clearly define the relationships among components, between the upper level and the lower level. It must be realized that as the organization of the command and its operations become more complex, its organization must become more scientific and regular-force.

Each component, cadre and personnel on the staff must be specialized and must possess professional, specialized skills; in particular, their command skills must be improved, such as their ability to perform combat planning staff work; their ability to serve as the combat rear service support staff; their ability to reconnoiter the enemy, organize signal operations, assess the situation and so forth. It is also necessary to establish scientific and regular-force work procedures and work style. Specifically, they must work under a plan, under regulations and principles; their style of work must be one of precision, urgency and thoroughness; their discipline in work and daily life must be strict. Until we establish the official regulations and principles of the local military command, temporary regulations and principles must be employed. We must take determined steps to stop the practice of relying upon local conditions as an excuse for doing as one sees fit, for fragmentation in work procedures and work style.

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

### PARTY DELEGATION ATTENDS PERUVIAN CP CONGRESS

OW161621 Hanoi VNA in English 1544 GMT 16 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Hanoi, VNA, Nov 16--A delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam led by Tran Danh Tuyen, deputy head of the party Commission for External Relations, attended the Seventh National Congress of the Peruvian Communist Party in Lima from Oct. 29 to Nov. 4.

In his opening speech, P.C.P. Secretary-General Jorge del Prado condemned the Beijing rulers for betraying socialism and pursuing an anti-Soviet and anti-communist policy. He said that with their great strength, the Vietnamese people had defeated French colonialism and U.S. imperialism, and won glorious victory over the Chinese aggressors, henchmen of imperialism. He also said that the Vietnamese people had helped consolidate the Kampuchean people's victory over the Maoist expansionists.

Addressing the congress, Tran Danh Tuyen acclaimed the role played by the Peruvian Communist Party in the struggle for peace, national independence, sovereignty over national natural resources, democracy and social progress. He expressed sincere gratitude to the communist party and other democratic and progressive forces in Peru for their strong support to the Vietnamese people. He vehemently condemned the Beijing authorities for colluding with imperialism to pursue a hostile policy towards Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

Tran Danh Tuyen said: "The Vietnamese people firmly advocate peace and strive for good relations with the Chinese people. We always favour negotiated settlements to all problems between the two countries. Yet, if the Beijing authorities obdurately continue their hostile policy, the Vietnamese people, closely united with the fraternal peoples of Kampuchea and Laos, will resolutely thwart all their expansionist and hegemonist schemes. We will firmly defend our national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity."

The Vietnamese delegation was cordially received by Jorge del Prado and other leaders of the Peruvian Communist Party. Everywhere it went, the delegation was accorded a warm welcome.

The Vietnamese party delegation left Lima on November 13.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

'VNA' ON WARSAW MEETING OF NEWS AGENCY DIRECTORS

OW171545 Hanoi VNA in English 1513 GMT 17 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Hanoi, VNA, November 17--The annual meeting of socialist news agency directors for this year was held in Warsaw on November 12-15.

Present were delegations of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Cuba, Laos, Kampuchea and Viet Nam. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Dao Tung, director-general of the Viet Nam News Agency.

The conference warmly welcomed the first participation of the Kampuchean delegation under Chay Sapon, director-general of S.P.K. and the Lao delegation led by Buonthong Thepvongsa, deputy director-general of K.P.L.

In their speeches, the delegates affirmed full support for the revolutionary causes of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, especially their close cooperation with the three Indochinese news agencies.

In its final document adopted at the closing session on November 15, the conference stressed the necessity to strengthen cooperation among socialist news agencies to foil propaganda by the Beijing expansionists and the imperialists, and to bring forth the achievements recorded by the socialist countries in all fields of activity. The conference also entrusted technical directors with the task of working out measures to provide assistance to the V.N.A., K.P.L. and S.P.K.

The delegates were received on November 14 by Jerzy Lukaszewicz, member of the Political Bureau and the secretariat of the Polish United Workers' Party, who reaffirmed Poland's full support for the defence and construction of Viet Nam, Kampuchea and Laos against international imperialism and its lackeys.

CSO: 4220

DELEGATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Hanoi, 30 Oct--A delegation of the Vietnamese Commission for Research of Party History led by its vice chairman Tran Tong paid a friendly visit to Czechoslovakia from October 16 to 23 at the invitation of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. During its stay in Czechoslovakia, the Vietnamese delegation exchanged views with leaders of the institute and visited a number of localities. It was cordially received by Josef Havlin, secretary of the C.P.C. Central Committee, who expressed admiration and support for the Vietnamese people's struggle to defend and rebuild the country. He sternly condemned the Beijing rulers for threatening to invade Vietnam. [OW310533 Hanoi VNA in English 1521 GMT 30 Oct 79 OW]

#### BRIEFS

DELEGATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Hanoi, 30 Oct--A delegation of the Vietnamese Commission for Research of Party History led by its vice chairman Tran Tong paid a friendly visit to Czechoslovakia from October 16 to 23 at the invitation of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. During its stay in Czechoslovakia, the Vietnamese delegation exchanged views with leaders of the institute and visited a number of localities. It was cordially received by Josef Havlin, secretary of the C.P.C. Central Committee, who expressed admiration and support for the Vietnamese people's struggle to defend and rebuild the country. He sternly condemned the Beijing rulers for threatening to invade Vietnam. [OW310533 Hanoi VNA in English 1521 GMT 30 Oct 79 OW]

WOMEN'S DELEGATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Hanoi, 30 Oct--A delegation of Vietnam women's union led by Nguyen Thi Thanh, vice-president of the union's Central Committee and president of the Ho Chi Minh City committee of the women's union, has paid a friendly visit to Czechoslovakia. During its stay the delegation discussed experiences with leading members of the Czech and Slovak women's unions and their grassroots organization. It visited a number of educational, medical, social and economic establishments, and attended meetings in solidarity with Vietnam. Wherever it went, the delegation was warmly welcomed by local leaders and people who expressed the Czechoslovak people's support for the Indochinese peoples and condemned China's reactionary policies. The Vietnamese guests were cordially received by Marie Kabrholova, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and president of the Czechoslovakia women's union. The latter warmly welcomed the delegation's visit and applauded the role played by the Vietnam women's union in national construction and in the struggle against the Chinese hegemonists. She also affirmed the full support of the Czechoslovak people for Vietnam. [Text] [OW310533 Hanoi VNA in English 1534 GMT 30 Oct 79 OW]

INTERCOSMOS CONFERENCE--Hanoi, 30 Oct--Vietnam, represented by Professor Doctor Nguyen Van Hieu, deputy director of the science institute, attended the 12th Intercosmos Conference in Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. Professor Nguyen Van Hieu reported on Vietnam's scientific program for the coming flight. Vietnam's participation in Intercosmos was hailed by other delegates, who also expressed readiness to assist it in developing its science and in application to economic construction. The Vietnamese delegation planned co-operation with the Soviet and Bulgarian delegation for 1980. [Text] [OW310533 Hanoi VNA in English 1618 GMT 30 Oct 79 OW]

DELEGATION TO GDR--Hanoi, 30 Oct--A delegation of the Vietnam committee for mother and child care headed by its President Dinh Thi Can, visited the German Democratic Republic from October 9 to 28 at the invitation of the Ministry of Health. While there, the delegation learned of the GDR's experience on the care of mothers and children, visited creches and medical, educational and cultural establishments. [OW310533 Hanoi VNA in English 1523 GMT 30 Oct 79 OW]

ECONOMIC CONTROL CONFERENCE--Hanoi, 2 Nov--A Vietnamese delegation, led by Tran Hieu, deputy head of the People's Supreme Inspectorate, has attended a conference in Sofia for similar bodies from all socialist countries. Delegates to the conference, the first of its kind, exchanged views on enhancing control work and strengthening socialist jurisdiction in the process of building and developing the socialist economy. [Hanoi VNA in English 1602 GMT 2 Nov 79 OW]

SRV AT WRITERS' CONFERENCE--Hanoi, 31 Oct--A delegation of Vietnamese writers headed by To Hoai, deputy general secretary of the writers association, has attended the second international conference held in Moscow for authors specializing in children's literature. The Vietnamese report concerned the development of literature for children in Vietnam over the past three decades. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1530 GMT 31 Oct 79 OW]

GREETINGS TO UK COMMUNISTS--Hanoi, VNA, 9 Nov--The Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee today sent a congratulation message to the Communist Party of Great Britain on its 36th congress, saying: "On behalf of the working class and people of Vietnam we wish your congress great success and the Communist Party of Great Britain an ever more important role in mobilizing and organizing the struggle of the British working people for genuine democratic rights, better living conditions and social progress, for the development of Great Britain along the path of independence, sovereignty and peace without subservience to NATO, thus, actively contributing to the relaxation of tension and to the defence of peace in Europe and the rest of the world. We sincerely thank your party and other progressive and peace-loving forces in Great Britain for your valuable support in our previous struggle against U.S. imperialism as well as in our present struggle against Beijing's great-power expansionism and hegemonism." [Text] [OW091851 Hanoi VNA in English 1531 GMT 9 Nov 79 OW]

NETHERLANDS ENVOY DEPARTURE--Hanoi, 14 Nov (NVA)--John Dolleman, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Holland, left here today, concluding his term of office in Vietnam. [Text] [OW141711 Hanoi VNA in English 1643 GMT 14 Nov 79 OW]

INDIAN ENVOY--Hanoi, VNA, November 14--Giteswar Raj, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of India to Vietnam, presented his credentials to Vice-President Nguyen Huu Tho today. The vice-president had a cordial talk with the Indian diplomat. [Text] [OW141545 Hanoi VNA in English 1530 GMT 14 Nov 79 OW]

JAPANESE MARXISTS RECEIVED--Hanoi, VNA, Nov 16--A group of Japanese Marxist philosophers had paid a fortnight's visit to Vietnam. The delegation included Prof Ohikatsugu Iwasaki, vice-chairman of the National Peace Council; Prof. Shingo Shibata, president of the Tokyo committee of the Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association; and Prof. Yutak Shimada. The guests paid a tribute at the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, and toured Ho Chi Minh City and the provincial town of Lang Son. They also called at the Vietnam Peace Committee, the Committee for Solidarity With Peoples of Other Countries, and the commission for investigation of Chinese aggressors' crimes. The delegation had meetings and exchanged views with Vietnamese social scientists on Beijing expansionism and hegemony, and on the alliance between Beijing, Washington and Tokyo. The visitors were cordially received by Tran Quang Huy, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and minister at the premier's office; and Nguyen Khanh Toan, president of the Social Sciences Commission. [Text] [OW161615 Hanoi VNA in English 1541 GMT 16 Nov 79 OW]

WFDY DELEGATION--Hanoi, VNA, Nov 16--Vice-President Nguyen Huu Tho yesterday received the delegation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth led by President Ernesto Ottonne. The vice-president thanked the WFDY and progressive youth throughout the world for their strong support for Vietnam's national construction and defence. Ernesto Ottonne, in reply, said that the movement of progressive and democratic youth considered itself as a part of the young generation of Vietnam, because it had matured through the struggle and the movement for solidarity with Vietnam. "The WFDY and the young generation throughout the world will do their best to further strengthen their solidarity with, and support for, the Vietnamese people against the Chinese expansionists," Ernesto Ottonne said. [Text] [OW161611 Hanoi VNA in English 1539 GMT 16 Nov 79 OW]

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## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECISION ON DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

BK140130 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 14 Nov 79 BK

[Decision on 5 November 1979 by SRV Council of Ministers on the Distribution of Income in Cooperatives and Agricultural Production Collectives]

[Text] In order to thoroughly understand the principles of distribution according to labor, contribute to consolidating socialist production relations, develop cooperative members' right to collective mastery, improve business accounting, accelerate agricultural production and insure cooperative members' livelihood, on 5 November 1979 the Council of Ministers issued a decision on the distribution of income in cooperatives and agricultural production collectives as follows:

1. The distribution of income in cooperatives and agricultural production collectives must follow exactly the principles of distribution according to labor, in combination with the improvement of collective welfare and, at the same time, must insure a rational relationship between capital accumulation and consumption in cooperatives and the state by closely combining monetary distribution with distribution of goods or natural produce--at present, mainly in grain.

#### A. Distribution of Monetary Income

After covering all the material expenses, including depreciation of fixed assets and payment of state taxes, it is primarily necessary to insure adequate payment for cooperative members' work in accordance with the planned rates of days worked before putting any excess--that is profit--into various funds. Workers must be rewarded or given additional remuneration for their days worked. The amount of funds will be increased or decreased depending on the amount of monetary profit. Funds will not be established if no monetary profit is made. Monetary excess will be allocated to the following three funds: 50 percent to the accumulation fund, 20 percent to the utility fund and 10 percent to the reserve fund. Half of the remaining will be used for rewards and the other for defraying additional days worked. No funds

and items of expenses other than the ones cited above can be established by cooperatives and production collectives, which may not use profits for any other purpose.

## B. Distribution of Grain

In order to insure compliance with the principles of primary distribution according to labor, after keeping enough seed as guided by the Ministry of Agriculture, grain will be delivered as taxes and sold to the state in accordance with the two-way economic contracts. The remaining grain will be used as follows: From 1 to 2 percent go to the utility fund, 1 percent to the reserve fund, about 10 percent will be sold regularly to those needy cooperative members' families lacking breadwinners and food--especially the families of fallen heroes, the wounded and revolutionaries--and the rest must be distributed to cooperative members according to their days worked.

Some of the grain to be distributed to cooperative members may be put aside as an incentive for fertilizer producers and as remuneration for workers in case the crop season is busy and urgent. This quantity of grain will be discussed and decided upon by cooperative members, and must be fully accounted for and distributed in the current crop season and not saved for distribution in the following crop season.

Along with distributing grain according to the number of days worked as mentioned above, cooperatives and production collectives must give grain rewards to those production teams overfulfilling their assigned plan norms for productivity and volume of production or value of production.

Of the volume of grain produced beyond the assigned plan norms, 80 percent must be used as rewards by cooperatives and production collectives. Of these 80 percent, from 70 to 80 percent will be used to reward those teams turning out this surplus grain and from 20 to 30 percent will be given to various animal raising teams or other professional and technical teams which have turned out values of income beyond the norms assigned by cooperatives.

2. In order to insure an increase in income for cooperatives and production collectives, along with making full use of land and labor, reorganizing production and expanding the operations of various secondary sectors and jobs, cooperatives and production collectives must most economically utilize their capital, materials and grain, and resolutely struggle against the misappropriation and waste of socialist assets.

Henceforth, the Council of Ministers forbids all forms of partying and entertainment by cooperatives. Cadres of all ranks going on temporary duty at cooperatives and production collectives must pay for their food. Anyone who wants to invite guests, must use his own money to cover expenses and not the funds of cooperatives and production collectives.

The inspection committees of cooperatives and responsible state agencies must strictly inspect and control the use of cooperative and production collective assets, especially the use of materials, grain and funds. The district level may not handle nor use the funds of cooperatives.

3. The rating of man-days for distribution of income in cooperatives and production collectives must be very strict. Only those man-days can be rated that are spent in production including those spent on the technical innovations to production, and those spent in the management of production including those spent in schools by trainees appointed by cooperatives and production collectives. Man-days spent in managerial work cannot account for more than four percent of the total number of man-days rated for distribution of income in cooperatives and production collectives.

The Ministry of Agriculture should issue a circular to provide guidance for making the organization of cooperatives' management compact and more rational, streamlining various components indirectly engaged in production. Managerial cadres of cooperatives and production collectives must also spend a given number of man-days directly in production to be designated by cooperative members collectively. The remuneration of those cooperative members performing cultural and social tasks will be borne by the utility fund of cooperatives and production collectives, and will not be included in the total number of man-days rated for distribution of income. Those man-days mobilized by the people's committees at various levels to perform various tasks for the state or to serve the local public will be accounted for as days worked to fulfill corvee duty and will not be rated for distribution of income in cooperatives and production collectives.

The people's committees at all levels as well as cooperatives and production collectives are absolutely not authorized to mobilize cooperative members to fulfill their corvee duty for more days than prescribed by the state.

4. The regular selling of grain in cooperatives and production collectives must be closely connected with the labor management of cooperatives and production collectives. As regards the families of fallen heroes, wounded and revolutionaries, if they don't have enough grain because of insufficient breadwinners even though they have tried to work their best in cooperatives and production collectives, they may purchase an additional amount of grain at the prices prescribed by the state in the purchase of compulsory grain quotas from the people, so that they can have enough to eat.

With respect to village cadres, they must primarily arrange their work rationally, streamlining the village machinery and reducing the number of meetings, so they can have time to participate in production. Particularly as regards some key cadres in charge of too many tasks in the villages and cooperatives, if they don't have enough grain even though they and their families have tried to engage in productive labor in cooperatives, they may buy some additional grain at the prices prescribed by the state in the

purchase of compulsory grain quotas from the people, or at slightly higher prices as decided upon by the cooperative members.

Cooperatives must ensure that members' families who have already actively worked but still do not have enough to eat because they have too many unproductive members to feed, receive enough to eat so that they can continue to work by selling them some grain regularly at the prices prescribed by the state in the purchase of compulsory grain quotas from the people or at slightly higher prices as decided upon by the cooperative members. Of these families, primary attention must be given to those whose members are serving their military obligations.

Cooperatives must use their utility funds to support members who do not have enough grain to eat because of their complete or partial inability to work and their lack of other support. Grain will absolutely not be sold to those who are fit to work but lazy and refuse to work for the collectives or to those who refuse to be placed under the labor management of cooperatives and production collectives.

5. The management committees of cooperatives and production collectives and various state agencies involved must fully respect the cooperative members' right to collective mastery over the distribution of income, which must be necessarily discussed and decided upon at the congress of cooperative members.

The management committees of cooperatives and production collectives should create favorable conditions for every cooperative member to participate in discussing and deciding the distribution of income. They must make the following items publicly known to the cooperative members so that the latter can take followup and control action:

A. All items of production costs including costs of means of production, costs of labor--specifying man-days spent in management--and agricultural taxes.

B. The purchase, use and storage of various means of production, especially the use of fuel, chemical fertilizers, insecticides and construction materials.

C. All receipts of cooperatives including the volume of products and money from their sales.

D. The establishment and use of collective funds.

E. The number of man-days of each cooperative member, the quantity of fertilizer produced by each family and the rate of grain distribution to each worker.

Cooperative members may ask to know any of the above items which the management committees fail to make public. When the harvest--the season for

distribution--comes, a committee to control the distribution of income in cooperatives and production collectives must be established. This committee is composed of the cooperative members' representatives elected by various production teams, and the delegates of the unions of collective peasants, women and Ho Chi Minh communist youths. The inspection and management committees of cooperatives and production collectives, the specialized cadres and various production teams are dutybound to provide the committee for distribution control with necessary documents so that it can operate.

6. This decision comes into effect with the 1979 10th-month crop season. All previous regulations conflicting with this decision are rescinded.

CSO: 4209



## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### 'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL ON SCALES OF COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

BK141210 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 9 Nov 79 BK

[NHAN DAN 10 November editorial: "Scales of Collective Economic Organizations"]

[Text] The agricultural cooperativization movement is governed by the principle that collective economic organizations must be developed from low to higher forms and from small to larger scales. This principles must be reflected in the determination of the forms and scales of collective economic organizations in the rural areas. Implementation of this guiding principle will not only help uphold the principle of voluntary participation but will also create concrete conditions for gradually raising the ability of cooperative members and administrative cadres to manage cooperatives in accordance with the development of production capacities, thereby enabling production to expand ceaselessly.

Determining the scales of collective economic organizations takes scientific work the success of which depends on various objective conditions: The masses' level of political awareness and capacity for collective mastery, cadres' experience in managerial work and the material and technical bases essential for collective production and the organization of the people's life. Of these conditions, cadres are decisive.

Certain comrades thought that establishment of production organizations in a high form and on a large scale would surely and quickly lead to large-scale production. Prompted by this thinking, they hastily set up high-level cooperatives and organized large-scale production units at a time when essential material conditions were still lacking. These large-scale units were eventually beset with difficulties caused by the absence of essential material and technical bases, the inadequacy of cadres' managerial skills and the failure to centralize management despite an all too fast increase in the number of cadres not directly involved in production. These attempts at large-scale centralized production have thus resulted only in lax management, delayed crop production and lower economic returns than when these units still remained on a relatively small scale.

Owing to differences in the specific conditions of each locality, the scales of local production organizations also vary. Excluding the forms of organizations adopted on a trial basis--such as labor exchange teams and production solidarity teams--the forms and scales of collective economic units in agriculture existing in various regions are as follows:

In the northern lowlands and midlands and the central coast: cooperatives cover about 200, 300 or 500 hectares each;

In the former Nam Bo provinces: production collectives cover about 30 or 50 hectares each; these collectives are attached to the regional production collective management boards;

In the northern mountain areas: Small cooperatives cultivate an average of 60 or 70 hectares of land each excluding forest land;

In the southern mountain areas: Production collectives or labor cooperation units [dooij howpj tacs lao doongj] have about 30 or 50 laborers each--60 or 70 laborers each in case of major collectives or units.

With the exception of certain localities which are facing difficulties in managerial work because they have organized units larger than the average scale, generally speaking, the current forms and scales are suitable for the standards of the masses and for the managerial skills of cadres. These forms and scales also make it possible for the collective organizations concerned to take the first step in reorganizing production and redistributing manpower, thereby creating new conditions for production from the grassroots level.

These scales should be maintained for a definite period of time so as to stabilize and develop production, normalize the living conditions of cooperative member families and prepare the conditions for future developmental steps.

The resolution of the sixth party Central Committee Plenum clearly pointed out: With regard to those cooperatives organized on too large a scale and, therefore, unsatisfactorily managed, provincial party committees, after careful consideration, may reorganize them on a more rational scale.

Whatever their forms and scales, all cooperatives and production collectives must meet the basic requirements of socialist collective economic organizations. The principal means of production must be collectivized: The main labor forces of cooperative or collective members must perform the required number of working days for the collectives; distribution must be carried out strictly in accordance with the established principles, especially the principle of distribution in accordance with one's work; and the right to collective mastery of cooperative or collective members must be respected and developed.

To stabilize the scales of collective production organizations and to constantly strengthen them in accordance with the above-mentioned guidelines are to ceaselessly strengthen and perfect the new production relationships, develop production, produce plenty of grain and foodstuffs, build a new countryside and improve the working people's living conditions.

CS0: 4209

## AGRICULTURE

### SRV PROVINCES TAKE MEASURES TO COMBAT DROUGHT

BK141635 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 13 Nov 79 BK

[Text] Affected by drought as a result of prolonged dry and sunny weather, many provinces and cities are short of water to irrigate winter crops, grow duckweeds and sow 5th-month rice seedlings.

At a time when the electric output has been reserved for industrial production during the fourth quarters, when a number of pumping stations and major irrigation projects have been shut down for repair and maintenance, when the winter crop acreage has been expanded rapidly, and when water for irrigation purposes is in very great demand, the level of water reserved at various reservoirs and dams is falling.

Faced with this situation, the Ministry of Water Conservancy has instructed various provinces and cities to quickly adopt necessary measures, making the fullest use of all available sources of water and existing means to actively draw water into the ricefields to protect the winter crops as well as to support the cultivation of duckweeds and the sowing of 5th-month rice seedlings.

In Hzi Hung Province, the movement to emulate with the Cau Ghe farmland water conservancy detachment continues to be carried out enthusiastically among the 242 water pumping stations. To insure that water is promptly supplied to help combat drought, workers at these stations have been ordered to remain on the standby, particularly from 2200 until dawn, in order to readily operate water pumps whenever electric power is available.

In Ha Son Binh Province, the Song Nghe and Hong Van farmland water conservancy management corporations have deployed work forces to carry out dredging activities at various major irrigation projects along with opening culverts and operating water pumps in Ung Hoa, Thuong Uin, Thanh Oai and My Duc districts in an effort to protect the winter crops against drought. The provincial water conservancy service has also dispatched cadres to such districts in the mountainous region as Mai Chau, Da Bac and Tan Lac to inspect dams and culverts at various reservoirs to insure that water is supplied in accordance with plans.

Ha Nam Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Ha Bac, Nghe Tinh and Vinh Phu provinces have already formed their forces to counter drought. Apart from drawing water into lakes and ponds, many cooperatives in Vinh Lac District, Vinh Phu Province, have mobilized their members using water buckets to irrigate potatoes, sweet potatoes and vegetables.

To insure enough water for the protection of rice and subsidiary and industrial crops against drought, Quang Nam-Danang, Nghia Binh, Phu Khanh, Thuan Hai, Dong Nai and Song Be provinces and Ho Chi Minh City have continued to mobilize the people to do small-scale irrigation work, such as expanding the canal and drainage ditch network and carrying out dredging activities at major irrigation projects, along with supplying electric power for the operation of water pumps.

The provinces in the Mekong River Delta region have also accelerated the construction of additional canals and drainage ditches while using small-scale water pumping stations to combat drought. Minh Hai, Ben Tre and Hau Giang provinces have organized labor forces to build more embankments to promptly divert brackish water from the ricefields during the northeast wind season. As a result, these provinces have been able to save tens of thousands of hectares of rice from being destroyed by brackish water.

The Ministry of Water Conservancy has urged all echelons and sectors to pay attention to providing guidance for the organization of the forces to combat drought in the ricefields, particularly for the 10th-month rice in the south and the winter crops in the north.

In Binh Tri Thien, Quang Nam-Danang, Nghia Binh and Phu Khanh provinces, it is necessary for localities recently affected by floods and typhoons to provide close guidance for the repair of irrigation projects damaged by floods and typhoons and satisfactorily manage and operate all existing pumping stations in order to insure enough water for the control of drought.

It is also necessary for the provinces in the midland and mountainous regions, including those in the mountainous regions of the former fourth and fifth zones and the central highlands, to immediately adopt measures inspecting all dams in order to promptly repair or mend all leaks, thereby actively retaining water for the cultivation of the winter-spring crops. Meanwhile, the provinces and cities in the Red River delta region should draw up plans for the supply of electric power to operate water pumps. They should also combine manual work with machinery to dredge all canals and drainage ditches to secure water for the protection of the winter crops against drought while insuring enough water for the cultivation of the 5th month-spring crops.



## HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

### 'NHAN DAN' EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT COUNTRY'S COAL INDUSTRY

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[NHAN DAN 12 November editorial: "Gradually Take the Coal Sector to the Position of Proportionate and Stabilized Growth"]

[Text] Coal is currently our country's main source of energy. Therefore, accelerating the exploitation of coal is an urgent and long-term requirement to insure the growth of various economic sectors and to boost exports.

Our sources of coal are abundant and of good quality. We have many different kinds of coal which are deposited in numerous centralized areas as well as in many localities throughout the country. Tens of small, medium and large sized mines with the material and technical bases necessary for coal exploitation have been and are being built. Meanwhile, forged through production and combat and imbued with a long-standing revolutionary tradition, workers of the coal sector are ardently attached to the fatherland and revolutionary undertakings. These are the ultimate conditions for the coal sector to grow steadily so as to supply the country with an ever larger quantity of coal.

Implementing the fourth party congress resolution, the coal sector has in recent years exerted great efforts. The coal output in 1977 showed a ten-fold increase over that in 1955 and nearly 50 percent more than the output recorded in 1965--the highest productive prewar year. In 1978 and 1979, due to the lack of vehicles, machinery, spare parts and raw and other materials and as a result of the destruction caused by the enemy and the effects of prolonged adverse weather conditions, coal production encountered many new difficulties. However, through the movement of emulate in overcoming all difficulties to firmly maintain production, the miners have been able to promote their revolutionary heroism by developing and applying thousands of innovations to production. They have voluntarily felled trees and moved timber to the worksites for use in the exploitation of coal from underground mines and in the protection of these mines against collapse. They have also manufactured or repaired various types of equipment and spare parts for vehicles and machinery.

Through this emulation movement many good examples have also been set by vehicle and machine operators in terms of professional skills and productivity, such as the excavation of 1 million cubic meters of dirt by mechanical shovels and the production of 100,000 tons of coal from secondary faces.

Along with affirming these successes, it is necessary to accurately review and adopt effective measures to overcome all shortcomings and weaknesses. The slow progress in coal exploitation over the past 2 years stemmed from the lack of technical bases and the imbalance of material elements in the execution of plans, from the failure to exploit coal in accordance with the technical regulations and standards, and from the many shortcomings in the supervision of equipment and in the management of manpower and improvement of its efficiency. The failure to maintain a balance among the exploration, exploitation and transportation programs, to invest in conformity with the production process, and to quickly determine a long-term project and plan is also a weakness which will bring about great obstacles to long-term development efforts.

To achieve new progress, it is necessary for the coal sector to concentrate great efforts on resolutely overcoming the aforementioned shortcomings and weakness. A new impetus has emerged at various coal mines since early October. As a result, the coal output in that month increased noticeably as compared with September. However, enormous difficulties remain. Only by adopting emergency measures and launching unplanned campaigns will the coal sector be able to meet a number of demands in a definite manner.

To accelerate coal production and insure the reserves of coal, the sixth party Central Committee plenum resolution has set forth the immediate tasks for the coal sector. These include efforts to overcome all difficulties concerning timber for use as supporting beams for coal faces, and explosives, spare parts and equipment.

To gradually take the coal sector to a stable position, it is necessary to adopt necessary measures in a uniform manner, determine a policy for coal exploitation, formulate plans for and invest in the construction of more mines, and increase technical equipment along with improving managerial work and training and fostering the cadres and workers.

## BIOGRAPHIC

### INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Hà Văn Ban [HAF VAWN BAN]

\* Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee, Thanh Hoa Province;  
\*Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Thanh Hoa Province; on 25 Sep 79 he attended a provincial conference to discuss physical education and sports progress during the past four years. (THE DUC THE THAO 6 Oct 79 p 1)

Đặng Quốc Bảo [DAWNGJ QUOOCS BAOR]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; 1st Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; recently he visited the Hoang Thach Cement Factory Work Site in Haiphong Municipality. (TIEN PHONG 9-15 Oct 79 p 2)

Lê Văn Cao [LEE VAWN CAO]

\*Acting Chairman of the People's Committee, Long An Province; recently he accompanied Vice President Nguyen Huu Tho on a visit of his province. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Chính [NGUYEENX VAWN CHINHS]

Alternate Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Long An Province; recently he accompanied Vice President Nguyen Huu Tho on visit of his province. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 1)

Đường Hồng Dật [DUWOWNGF HOONGF ZAATJ]

Vice Minister of Agriculture; his article "Science and Technology and Agricultural Production" appeared in the 25th Anniversary of the cited source. (KHOA HOC VA DOI SONG 1 Oct 79 p 4)

Nguyễn Thị Định [NGUYEENX THIJ DINHJ]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; First Vice President of the Vietnam Women's Association; on 18 Oct 79 she attended a meeting to mark the anniversary of the Vietnam Women's Association. (NHAN DAN 20 Oct 79 p 1)

Nguyễn Đăng [NGUYEENX DAWNG]

Vice Minister of Agriculture; on 19 Oct 79 he accompanied Political Bureau Member Pham Hung on a visit to An Giang Province. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 4)

Trần Đông [TRAANF DOONG]

\*Vice Minister of the Interior; on 19 Oct 79 he attended a conference held in Hanoi by the Ministry of Interior to sum up the 1975-79 "Safeguarding the Security of the Fatherland" Movement. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 1)

Trần Đức [TRAANF DUWCS]

Head of the Institute of Planning and Management Research of the State Planning Commission; spoke at a conference held in Hanoi in mid May 1979 by the Central Institute of Economic Management Research subordinate to the VCP Central Committee and the SRV Council of Ministers to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the proclamation of the first USSR five-year plan. (NGHIEN CUU KINH TE No 4, Aug 79 p 78)

La Lâm Gia [LA LAAM GIA]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; \*Vice Minister of Food; on 19 Oct 79 he accompanied Political Bureau Member Pham Hung on a visit to An Giang Province. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 4)

Nguyễn Xuân Hữu [NGUYEENX XUAAN HUWUX]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Phu Khanh Province; on 12 Oct 79 he attended the 2nd Congress of Delegates of the VCP Organization, Phu Khanh Province to discuss past accomplishments and future plans. (NHAN DAN 21 Oct 79 p 1)

Lê Hữu Khai [LEE HUWUX KHAIR]

\*Member of the VCP Committee, Thanh Hoa Province; \*Head of the Science and Education Department of the Province VCP Committee; on 25 Sep 79 he attended a provincial conference to discuss physical education and sports progress during the past four years. (THE DUC THE THAO 6 Oct 79 p 1)

Phước Minh Nam [PHUWOWNG MINH NAM]

\*Deputy Chief of Cabinet in the Office of the Premier for Domestic Affairs; on 19 Oct 79 he attended a conference held in Hanoi by the Ministry of Interior to sum up the 1975-79 "Safeguarding the Security of the Fatherland" Movement. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 1)

Lê Văn Nhung [LEE VAWN NHUNG]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Secretary of the VCP Committee, An Giang Province; on 19 Oct 79 he accompanied Political Bureau Member Pham Hung on a tour of his province. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 4)

Nguyễn Thị Nhung [NGUYEENX THIJ NHUNG]

Deputy Secretary of the Trade Union Federation, Hanoi; her article on protection of workers' rights and well being appeared in the cited source. (PHU NU VIETNAM 10-16 Oct 79 p 2)

Đoàn Phúởng [DOANF PHUWOWNG]

Vice Chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission; \*Chairman of the Vietnam Sub Committee of the Vietnam-USSR Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation; on 15 Oct 79 he attended a meeting of the Committee in Moscow to mark twenty years of scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the SRV. (NHAN DAN 22 Oct 79 p 1)

Bùi Quang Tao [BUIF QUANG TAOJ]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; \*Secretary of the VCP Committee, Haiphong; on 2 Oct 79 he attended the 5th Congress of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 17 Oct 79 p w)

Vương Thị Tân [VUWOWNG THI TAANF]

\*Chairman of the People's Committee, 10th Precinct, Ho Chi Minh City; her article on equal rights for women appeared in the cited source. (PHU NU VIETNAM 10-16 Oct 79 p 2)

Lê Quốc Thân [LEE QUOOC THAAN]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; \*Deputy Chief of the Domestic Policy Department of the Central Committee of the VCP [ban nội chính Trung ương Đảng]; on 19 Oct 79 he attended a conference held in Hanoi by the Ministry of Interior to sum up the 1975-79 "Safeguarding the Security of the Fatherland" Movement. (NHAN DAN 25 Oct 79 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Thập [NGUYEENX THIJ THAAPJ]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly; Honorary President of the Vietnam Women's Association; on 18 Oct 79 she attended a meeting to mark the anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Women's Association (NHAN DAN 20 Oct 79 p 1)



Đoàn Trọng Truyền [DOANE TRONGJ TRUYEENS]

\*Deputy head of the Central Institute of Economic Management Research subordinate to the VCP Central Committee and the SRV Council of Ministers, spoke at a conference held in Hanoi in mid May 1979 by the Institute to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the first USSR five-year plan. (NGHIEN CUU KINH TE No 4, Aug 79 p 77)

Phan Đình Tung [PHAN DINHF TUNGJ]

Vice chairman of the People's Committee and chairman of the Planning Commission of Ha Nam Ninh Province; spoke at a conference held in Hanoi in mid May 1979 by the Central Institute of Economic Management Research subordinate to the VCP Central Committee and the SRV Council of Ministers to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the proclamation of the first USSR five-year plan. (NGHIEN CUU KINH TE No 4, Aug 79 p 78)

Huà Văn Ước [HUWAS VAWN UWOWCS]

\*Director of the Port of Hanoi; his article on cargo handling appeared in the cited source. (LAO DONG 11 Oct 79 p 11)

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